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[Text] Ever since the victory of the October Revolution 60 years ago in Russia began a new era in the world history of mankind, all important events occurring in the nation of the Soviets acquire universal significance and have great international repercussions. This indicates the magnetic force exerted by the ideals and accomplishments of socialism on the people of our planet. The publication of program documents of the CPSU and the Soviet Government invariably evoke particular interest; these reflect the conquests of the socialist order and outline the new prospects for communist construction.

Now our entire nation is carefully investigating the draft of the new Soviet Constitution, which was drawn up by the Constitutional Commission, ratified by a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and submitted for discussion by the entire population; it will replace the present constitution of 1936. The scope of the fundamental changes that have occurred during recent decades in all areas of life in the Soviet society requires that they be formulated and secured by law. "Socialism is a dynamically developing society. We do not remain idle for a single day, we are always progressing,"¹ said General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, who was elected chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Ninth Convocation.

Within the last 60 years, our nation has traveled a course that would normally require centuries.

A developed, mature socialist society has been constructed in the USSR--"a society unlike any mankind has ever known. This is a crisis-free society with a constantly growing economy, mature socialist relations and real freedom. This is a society in which the scientific materialistic outlook prevails. This is a society of unshakeable confidence in the future and glorious communist prospects."²

The draft of the new constitution contains a detailed description of the developed, mature socialist society. Its main feature is the continuous expansion and intensification of socialist democracy. The democratic principles governing the organization and activity of soviets of people's deputies are being developed; plans have been made for these soviets to play a greater role in the resolution of the most important social problems; a system is being established which will make all executive organs more strictly accountable to elected authorities. The practice of universal discussion of the drafts of unionwide laws is being secured by law.

In accordance with the communist ideal--"the free development of each individual is necessary for the free development of all individuals"--the highest goal of the Soviet State is proclaimed in Article 20 of the draft: broader opportunities for the citizens of the USSR to develop and apply their creative power, abilities and gifts and opportunities for all-round personality development.

Immediately after the draft of the new constitution had been published in the Soviet press, the complete text of the draft or long excerpts from this document were reprinted in almost all nations of the world.

The world press called this document "a historical event" and "an important milestone."

The draft of the new Soviet Constitution reflects the great victories of socialism; it not only formulates the general principles of the socialist order, which express the class essence of our state, but also defines the basic features of the developed socialist society and its political organization. While it retains the fundamental premises of the present constitution of 1936, the new draft also summarizes all of the constitutional experience in Soviet history and enriches it with new meaning in accordance with the requirements of the present era.

Our nation has reached a high level of economic, scientific, technical and cultural development. While Russia accounted for only slightly more than 4 percent of the world's industrial production prior to the October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet Union now produces one-fifth of this total product. Socialist ownership reigns supreme in the USSR. An integral, powerful national economic organism has taken shape and is operating successfully; it is being developed through the coordination of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of the socialist order.

One of the other major results of the last 60 years consists in the growing social homogeneity of the Soviet society. The strong and indestructible alliance of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the popular intelligentsia, and the equality of different nationalities--not only in the legal sense, but actual equality in every sense--these are the social characteristics of the developed, mature socialist society, in which the differences between its basic social groups are gradually being eradicated. A historically

new human community--the Soviet population--has been created in the USSR. And our government, which arose as a dictatorship of the proletariat, has grown into a government of the people now that the mature socialist society has been constructed and the entire population has taken the ideological and political stand of the working class.

The draft of the new constitution deals a severe blow to the ideological positions of socialism's opponents--the bourgeois and revisionist "theoreticians" who have frightened the public in their own nations since the first days of the October Revolution by referring to the "communist threat," by distorting the actual meaning of dictatorship by the proletariat and by slandering the Soviet governmental structure. They have described the soviets as almost the opposite of democracy. But now the entire world can see that it was precisely a proletarian dictatorship that cleared the path to the most humane type of government and the first government of all the people in history, and that only this proletarian dictatorship could have done this. The Soviet socialist state, performing the functions of a dictatorship by the proletariat, became a state characterized by the ideological unity of all social strata, strong friendship between all nationalities and ethnic groups and genuine, extensive democracy.

The leading and guiding force in Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and all governmental and public organizations has been and remains the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, since the time of the October Revolution to the present day. "The CPSU exists for the people and it serves the people." States Article 6 of the draft of the constitution. "Armed with Marxist-Leninist teachings, the Communist Party determines the general prospects for the development of society and the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR, it supervises the great constructive activity of the Soviet people and it provides the people's struggle for the triumph of communism with a planned, scientifically substantiated nature."³

Sections on the defense of the socialist fatherland and on foreign policy are included in the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR for the first time. Article 31 states that the Soviet Government will safeguard the socialist conquests and peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the USSR.

In his report at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on 24 May, L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Constitutional Commission, spoke of the reasons and prerequisites for the compilation of a new Soviet Constitution; these included the fundamental changes in the international position of the USSR and in the total socio-political appearance of the world. "The USSR is no longer surrounded by capitalism. Socialism has become a worldwide system. A powerful socialist community has been formed. The positions of worldwide capitalism have been considerably weakened. Dozens of young states opposing imperialism have sprung up on the site of former colonies. The international prestige and influence of our nation have increased immeasurably."

"As a result, the alignment of forces in the world arena is now completely different. The real possibility of preventing a new world war has arisen."⁴

The section on Soviet foreign policy in the draft states that the Soviet Government is consistently conducting the Leninist policy of peace and is favoring the reinforcement of national security and extensive international cooperation.

Article 28 states that military propaganda is prohibited by law in the USSR and that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at the prevention of aggressive wars.

"The USSR's relations with other states are based on the observance of the principle of mutual refusal to use force or the threat of force; sovereign equality; the inviolability of borders; the territorial integrity of states; the peaceful regulation of disputes; nonintervention in domestic affairs and respect for human rights, basic freedoms, equality and the right of nations to control their own fate; cooperation between states; the conscientious fulfillment of obligations arising from universally accepted principles and norms of international law and from international agreements concluded by the USSR" (Article 29).

The constitutional securing of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social structures is of great fundamental significance. The Soviet Union has observed this principle to the letter from the first days of October. In his speech at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of 8 November 1917, V. I. Lenin proposed that a declaration of peace be addressed to the people and the governments of the bourgeois states. From the Decree on Peace to the Program of Peace, proposed by the 24th CPSU Congress, and the Program of Continued Struggle for Peace, International Cooperation, Freedom and Independence, adopted at the 25th CPSU Congress, our party and government have displayed the continuity of the main aspects of this policy of peace.

The Western press, including the American press, prints many speculative discussions on Soviet foreign policy and expresses all kinds of "doubts" as to the consistency and duration of the course toward detente. For many years, capitalist ideologists have tried to interpret the thesis of peaceful coexistence not as the USSR's sincere desire for constructive peaceful cooperation with the nations in the West, but as nothing more than a "Soviet diplomatic maneuver" and a "tactical subterfuge"⁵ with the purpose of weakening the vigilance of the West and "winning supremacy."⁶ In recent years, these fantasies have been voiced by various types of anti-Soviets in the United States and other nations. Some kind of "Politburo document" about the "domination of the West during the next 10-15 years" was even fabricated to substantiate the "validity" of these statements, as Congressman B. Blackburn reported in the U.S. House of Representatives on 9 April 1974 without batting an eyelash. The idea that the principle of peaceful coexistence is a "new" policy that came into use only recently is quite widespread in American political literature.⁷

The inclusion of the section on foreign policy in the draft of the fundamental law of the USSR provides a clear and unequivocal response to these kinds of fabrications and speculations in regard to the foreign policy goals of the Soviet State.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government are doing a truly titanic amount of work to implement the Leninist foreign policy. "For the entire 60 years of the Soviet State's existence, our foreign policy course has been aimed at the safeguarding of peace and security for our nation and all people. The elimination of the threat of war, the cessation of the arms race and the intensification and expansion of cooperation of benefit to all states--these are the goals of Soviet initiatives in the international arena today, just as they have been in the past. We intend to continue our policy of detente and to spread detente to all regions of the world," said L. I. Brezhnev recently in an interview granted to the Japanese ASAHI newspaper. "Our nation has always favored a complete ban on nuclear weapons--it has favored this since the time these weapons made their appearance in the world.... I can definitely say that the Soviet Union is ready at any time to sit at the negotiations table with all other nuclear powers for the purpose of the joint determination of specific solutions to the problem of nuclear disarmament.

"The Soviet Union has been conducting talks with the United States on the limitation of strategic arms for several years now. We feel that this has had important results. The talks are still going on. They are based on the famous Vladivostok Agreement. We are striving for the productive completion of these talks within the near future. Naturally, this will only be possible if our partners do not try to gain any onesided advantages for themselves. We will not agree to anything that might harm the security of the Soviet Union and our allies."⁸

Even many organs of the bourgeois press, including the American NEW YORK TIMES, NEW YORK POST and NEWSDAY, in their reports and commentaries on the inclusion of a foreign policy section in the constitution, have pointed out the complete correspondence of this section of the draft of the Soviet Constitution to the premises of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This admission is all the more noteworthy when we consider that the President's report in the beginning of June on the fulfillment of the final act crudely distorted the actual state of affairs in the USSR in such spheres as the respect for human rights, freedom of worship and religious beliefs, as well as the activities of foreign journalists on the territory of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the report states that the premises of the final act in regard to human rights are being implemented "excellently on the whole" in the United States. The President of the United States preferred to say nothing about the fate of those citizens who are thrown into prison for their political convictions, about the fact that millions of black Americans, American citizens of Mexican and Puerto Rican extraction and, finally, the native population of the country--the Indians--have been deprived of the basic human rights and

are being subjected to the most severe racial discrimination in the United States, or about the fact that the rights and freedoms that are declared in the American Constitution largely exist only on paper.

It was precisely during those same days in June that Ben Chavis, the leader of the group of civil rights fighters known as the "Wilmington Ten," again appealed to President J. Carter. In his letter, B. Chavis mentioned the hundreds of other U.S. citizens who are now behind bars, incarcerated there on the strength of false accusations, but actually arrested and convicted because of the color of their skin, their political convictions or their actions in defense of civil rights. The United States, B. Chavis writes, has no grounds for representing itself to the world as the "torch-bearer of democracy" and as a model to be emulated in the observance of human rights.

Despite the many facts providing documentary proof of the innocence of the "Wilmington Ten," despite the admissions of witnesses at the trial that they gave false evidence under pressure by the authorities and despite the appeals for their release by the American and world public, these innocent men are still in prison.

All of this attests to the fact that the United States prefers to "defend human rights" anywhere but at home. Attempts are being made to force this model of "respect for human rights" on our nation as well, although it has long been a well-known fact that neither pressure on the USSR from outside nor the ill-intentioned commentaries of organs of the bourgeois press and radio can divert the Soviet people from their chosen course of communist construction. They also do not have the power to cast aspersions on the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR or to denigrate its significance.

The draft of the new constitution proclaims and guarantees the right to work, to the free choice of a profession, public health care and maternity benefits, financial security for the aged, compulsory secondary education, housing and others as part of the large group of socioeconomic rights touching upon the most basic aspects of life in the Soviet society (Section 7). The provision of these rights is ensured by the socialist economy, the constant augmentation of productive forces in society and the entire system of socialism. This section also formulates the political rights and freedoms of citizens of the Soviet Union in greater detail than the present constitution, including the right to participate in the management of governmental and public affairs, to submit proposals to state organs and public organizations and to criticize shortcomings in their work.

There is not and cannot be anything of the kind in the constitutions of the capitalist nations. For example, the U.S. Constitution, which was 200 years old in 1976, does not even mention the basic vital rights of the individual, particularly the right to work--the source of man's living--or the right to a guaranteed wage and an old-age pension, without which all of the "freedoms" of the capitalist society remain a fiction for the workers and the privilege of the propertied classes.

In connection with this, we should note that some organs of the American press admit the "completely different theories" lying at the basis of the approach to the question of human rights in the constitutions of the USSR and the United States. "The Constitution of the USSR envisages fuller rights than any constitution in the West," states, for example, the BALTIMORE SUN. The draft of the new Constitution of the USSR "contains guarantees of the most important human rights--the right to work, leisure, medical care, housing and financial security for the aged," the NEW YORK TIMES points out.

At the same time, the U.S. press cannot conceal the sorry fate of the "superfluous people" in America--millions and millions of Americans who do not have jobs and are constantly the victims of degradation and disregard for their human worth.

V. I. Lenin and the party of Bolsheviks he founded always regarded the constitution as not merely a legal act, but also an important political document which secured that which had already been gained and proclaimed the basic objectives and goals of communist construction. The new constitution will be the fourth in the Soviet order's 60 years of existence, and each of these constitutions has been a milestone which has attested to new historic socialist achievements and has set new objectives in the consistent and dynamic progression of the Soviet nation toward communism.

"The highest goal of the Soviet State is the construction of a classless communist society," the preamble of the draft of the new constitution states. "The main objectives of the state consist in the establishment of a material and technical basis for communism, the improvement of socialist social relations and their transformation into communist relations, the indoctrination of the individual of the communist society, the elevation of the material and cultural standard of living of the workers, the safeguarding of national security, the promotion of lasting peace and the development of international cooperation."

The draft of the new Soviet Constitution is a convincing rebuttal to those circles in the West, including circles in the United States, said Gus Hall, general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States of America, that are babbling about "human rights" in the capitalist society and are passing themselves off as "defenders of democracy," even though they have no grounds for doing this. In the capitalist society, priority is always given to the right to acquire profit from the exploitation of others. Human rights and the "rights" of corporations are incompatible.

The nationwide discussion of the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR, the enthusiasm and active efforts of the Soviet people, their passionate concern and unanimous approval prove that the people of our nation consider the publication of this draft during the year marking the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution to be an important milestone in their history. The text of the draft conclusively corroborates the fact that socialism has ensured unprecedented rates of progress in all areas of

the life of the Soviet society during the last six decades. "The historic revolutionary feats of the Soviet people," the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" points out, "their success in the struggle to construct a communist society and the victories they have gained along the difficult and unexplored path which our nation has been following for 60 years now have won recognition throughout the world. They represent a direct continuation of the October Revolution and the realization of the great Lenin's ideals."

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 86.
2. Ibid., p 87.
3. PRAVDA, 4 June 1977.
4. Ibid., 5 June 1977.
5. This was reported, in particular, by the notorious "Sovietologists" invited to hearings before H. Jackson's Senate subcommittee to "explain the meaning of detente," W. Laqueur (Georgetown University), L. Labedz, professor of the history and politics of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries at the Universities of London and Paris, and B. Lewis from the University of London ("Negotiation and Statecraft," Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 17 April and 12 July 1973, Wash., 1973).
6. For example, R. Bowie, Harvard University professor who has spent many years "studying" Soviet foreign policy, wrote that, although the Soviet formula of "peaceful coexistence" is aimed at the "avoidance of the risk of nuclear war and confrontation," it also has the purpose of making the Soviet Union "the dominant power in Europe" (THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 14 June 1972).
7. See, for example, G. Fite and N. Graebner, "Recent United States History," N.Y., 1972, p 658; A. Rapoport, "The Big Two," N.Y., 1972, p 161.
8. PRAVDA, 6 June 1977.

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WASHINGTON AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 9-21 LD

[Article by I. A. Geyevskiy]

[Text] The "human rights" campaign fanned by Washington has been raised by the new administration to the level of a state policy. Under the flag of this campaign the White House and the State Department have taken ostentatious steps pursuing the goal of interference in the internal affairs of the USSR and the other socialist countries.

Washington figures deny the anti-Soviet, antisocialist thrust of their campaign and advertise it as some kind of global crusade in the name of humanist ideals. In his inaugural speech 20 January 1977 President J. Carter declared, for instance, that U.S. policy would reflect the "highest ideals" and the "moral strength of our country."¹ Judging by appearance, Washington is not only aspiring to represent "defense of human rights" as one of the main elements in its foreign policy--an attempt is being made to proclaim some kind of "moral principle" as the chief motive force of the U.S. foreign policy line as a whole.

In this connection the questions arise: What has occasioned this noisy campaign? What are its genuine political and ideological sources? What expectations are the U.S. ruling circles pinning on it?

Washington itself prefers not to dilate on this but disseminates propaganda fairytales designed more to conceal than to reveal the ins and outs of the new administration's present maneuvers. It is attempted to link the new administration's emphasis on the human rights problem with the President's personality and moral principles, primarily his religiousness. Back during the election campaign Carter repeatedly stressed that his "religious convictions" would not allow him "to do what Nixon and Johnson did--lie, deceive and distort the truth."² This stress on religious convictions is nothing new; rather, it is a traditional attribute of American politics. In their time both Johnson and Nixon (like many presidents before them) also constantly presented themselves as profoundly religious

men. This did not prevent them from transgressing Biblical precepts and violating their oath and the Constitution.

Another line of the semiofficial Washington propaganda campaign is connected with the attempts to represent it as a continuation of traditional U.S. policy. It is precisely this interpretation that President Carter gave in his speech at the United Nations. He asserted that the United States has the age-old historical right to identify itself "with respect for fundamental human rights" and that the present U.S. foreign policy "accords with America's historic ideals and duty."³

If we are to talk not about the history of political rhetoric in the United States but about the country's real political history, little grounds can be found for statements of this kind. Neither the extermination of the Indians, nor the slavery of the Negroes, nor the seizure of other countries' territories and the oppression of other peoples, nor Palmer's roundups of "Reds" can be erased from U.S. history. And as far as a time closer to us--the postwar period--is concerned, throughout it the United States has supported the most reactionary and tyrannical regimes throughout the world, has flouted the people's inalienable right to decide their fate themselves and has not stopped at direct armed intervention. All these are generally known facts.

The real reasons for Washington's present campaign have nothing whatever to do with either religious convictions or foreign policy traditions. They are connected with American imperialism's tactical and strategic goals and with the domestic and foreign policy tasks which it sets itself.

The attempts to proclaim lofty motives as the driving forces of U.S. foreign policy are not fundamentally new. The ruling circles have resorted to them throughout the country's entire history. The ideas of having been "chosen by God" and of "manifest destiny" long ago became part of the armory. Washington began to masquerade in moral and political armor particularly extensively after World War II when it officially declared itself the "leader in all the Free World" and proclaimed its goal as the "defense of freedom" in all countries. "We," Senator Vandenberg asserted, "must exercise moral leadership of the world, or the world will remain without leadership at all."⁴ In practice the statements about "moral leadership" of the world camouflaged U.S. hegemonic aspirations, while the slogan of defense of the "freedom of the peoples" provided the ideological substantiation for the military-political doctrines of the "containment" of communism and the policy of suppressing the national liberation movements. As a result these slogans became as devalued as the Cold War policy as a whole.

In the last few years American bourgeois ideologists and politicians have begun to renew their ideological and political arsenal. They have chosen the slogan of "defense of human rights" which, according to their notions, is more suited to the era of the relaxation of international tension. The

U.S. ruling circles have been forced to reckon with the fundamental shifts in forces in the world arena and to take into account the changes in Americans' sentiments which, as Z. Brzezinski has noted, are now characterized by "hostility toward the from-a-position-of-strength policy."⁵ Direct gambling on confrontation with the socialist countries corresponded with the old slogans; the strategy of undermining socialism by more refined methods corresponds with the new one. As in the past, anticommunism constitutes the core of the new slogan, but an anticommunism which is not so overt, which is subtler and better camouflaged.

The fuss surrounding "human rights" is aimed at undermining socialism's world positions and tremendous prestige in the international arena. It is aimed at discrediting real socialism and thereby weakening the magnetic force of the ideas of scientific communism, disorienting progressive forces in the West and complicating relations within the ranks of the world communist movement. At the same time this propaganda campaign is connected with Washington's policy line of strengthening the U.S. role in the world arena, primarily consolidating the alliance and expanding cooperation with the developed capitalist countries.

However, the implementation of the plans for strengthening American political influence in the world is hampered in particular by the fact that the United States, as "psychological warfare" specialists Prof G. Gordon and Prof I. Falk wrote in 1973, "looks worse than any other country in the world public's eyes."⁶

By proclaiming itself the champion of human rights throughout the world American imperialism hopes to cleanse itself of the blood with which it was stained in Vietnam and of the dirt of Watergate and to restore the international prestige of the United States which is, as the Democrats' election program admitted, "a country isolated abroad and split at home."⁷ It also hopes in this way to strengthen its ideological and political positions inside the United States itself.

The U.S. dominant class is profoundly concerned by the progressive weakening in the influence of bourgeois ideology in its own country. As many public opinion polls have shown, it is not a matter of a negative reaction by particular groups of the population to individual actions by the government but of an all-embracing, profound and constantly developing process. It is not secondary postulates of bourgeois ideology and moral and ethical values which have begun to be eroded. The spirit of criticism and disillusionment with traditional value orientations which has enveloped some students since the beginning of the sixties has begun to spread, with certain modification, to broader strata of the population. P. Cadell, leader of Cambridge Survey Research, one of the most influential organizations for the study of public opinion, has noted that "basic values which even quite recently were almost inviolable have lately been seriously questioned."⁸ Well-known sociologist Yankelovich has come to this conclusion: "Between the end of the sixties and the beginning of the

seventies...there occurred a sharp intensification in public distrust and cynicism and an erosion [of confidence] in state institutions...."⁹ In the words of J. Burns, president of the American Political Science Association, "political scientists are assessing the political system's state of health more pessimistically than ever before."¹⁰

Of course, the importance of negative sentiments in the United States should not be exaggerated--the bulk of Americans still do not see the profound socioeconomic roots of the superstructural phenomena which they are rejecting. Nevertheless, the shifts in mass consciousness are certainly developing in a direction which does not suit the dominant class. It is particularly alarmed by the new phenomena in the mass consciousness which D. Bell has called the "revolution of rising expectations."¹¹ Increasingly broad masses of Americans, Bell notes, are no longer satisfied with the proclaimed "equality of opportunity"; they are demanding "equality of results." They are addressing their socioeconomic demands largely to the state, bringing up the kind of problems that "it does not know how to cope with."¹² In this connection the conclusions of the so-called Trilateral Commission in whose activity, in particular, J. Carter, W. Mondale and Z. Brzezinski took an active part, are also of interest. One of the commission's reports--"The Crisis of Democracy"¹³--noted that despite the expansion of the state's activity in the socioeconomic sphere, "Americans have less trust in the government than 10 years ago."

The processes of the exacerbation of bourgeois society's social antagonisms are aggravated by the spiritual impoverishment of the ruling class. It is not for nothing that Professor Brzezinski noted the "kind of spiritual vacuum"¹⁴ which has formed in the United States and certain other Western countries. At the end of 1975, M. Mansfield, former leader of the Democrats in the Senate, pointed out the "dangerous cracks of a social split" which have affected "the very foundations of the nation."¹⁵

The urgent task of overcoming this split confronts the U.S. dominant class as a most important domestic political problem.

The situation of sociopolitical split and spiritual crisis in the country also conditioned Carter's election campaign and certain of his actions since his arrival in the White House. Probably never before in U.S. history has any leader talked so constantly of the need to overcome the split in the country. In his speech at the Democratic Party convention on 15 July 1976 Carter called for the creation of a "united" America.¹⁶ In his election victory statement he again urged Americans to make the country "unified" [yedinyy] and to "mobilize...a sense of community in our country" in order to "unite it and make it great again and to help unite the country and rally it together again."

In the traditional speech after the swearing-in ceremony 20 January 1977 the President urged Americans over and over again "to create together a new national spirit of unity and trust" and "to believe fully once again in our country and one another."

The attempt to close the "dangerous cracks" which have formed in society is not only aimed at strengthening the capitalist system in the country. It is also directly connected with Washington's foreign policy plans.¹⁷ At his inauguration the President himself declared in this connection: "Our country can be strong abroad only if it is strong here at home."¹⁸

The antiwar sentiments which gripped the broadest strata of the American population during the Vietnam war still remain an important restraining factor which limits to a definite extent Washington's potential for resorting to armed intervention. In Brzezinski's opinion, the American public nowadays subscribes to the following views: It believes that it is necessary to change the system of national priorities and to pay attention in the first place to domestic and not foreign problems, it constantly displays less inclination than in the past to support high expenditures for military purposes; it is less inclined to regard the USSR as a source of a direct threat to U.S. interests; it has a much more approbatory attitude toward proposals that the numerical strength of American Armed Forces abroad be reduced or that they be withdrawn altogether.¹⁹ W. Watts and L. Free, American specialists in the analysis of public opinion, came to similar conclusions. "The anticommunist sentiments which prevailed before have given way to a more balanced approach,"²⁰ they wrote, meaning the approach toward the socialist countries.

As the investigations which have been carried out show, the American public's critical sentiments have extended not to individual aspects but to certain fundamental directions of U.S. foreign policy. The policy of military adventures, the U.S. aspiration to play the role of "world policeman," the policy line of arms race and the inflation of the military budget to the detriment of the people's interests have been widely condemned.

Under these conditions the U.S. ruling circles began seriously to ponder ways and means of overcoming the sociopolitical split in the country. Washington would like to solve the task of restoring to some extent "consensus" on foreign policy issues but without touching on the foundations of the task. A most important role in this job has been assigned to the campaign "in defense of human rights." Washington's tactical scheme is obvious: the slogan of "defense of human rights" is assigned the role of a kind of ideological bait. In representing itself as the champion of moral and humanist ideals Washington hopes that the American public will support not only this campaign itself but its foreign policy line as a whole.

Why did the U.S. ruling circles, primarily the Democratic Party leadership, choose a moral and political and not a socioeconomic slogan? In the past Roosevelt's "New Deal," Truman's "Fair Deal," Kennedy's "New Frontier" and Johnson's "Great Society"--all these ringing slogan-programs had promised Americans the solution of socioeconomic problems through broad use of the state-monopoly mechanism. At present the

Democratic leadership is not pinning its former hopes on state intervention as a panacea for all socioeconomic ills. Although during the last election campaign the Democrats did issue many promissory notes, they realize that it will be very complicated to pay out on them, to solve the chronic socioeconomic problems.

Washington's sham concern about "human rights violations" in the socialist countries is a diversionary maneuver from the viewpoint of one of its domestic political goals. Americans' attention is artificially distracted from both the real socioeconomic problems and the real flagrant violations of political and civil rights in the United States itself. At the same time the blatant slander of the socialist countries is designed to provide the ideological ferment to stimulate the revival of anticommunist sentiments and views.

While declaring its adherence to "fundamental human rights," Washington is striving to narrow this concept as much as possible, to drain it of real content and to adapt it to the needs of its foreign policy. Attempts are made to reduce human rights to the "free flow of people, ideas and information." In practice this means the demand that the Soviet Union decide the question of the emigration of Soviet citizens as Washington sees fit and give the so-called "dissidents" totally unrestricted freedom to carry out the anti-Soviet propaganda and undermine the socialist system. They want all restrictions on the dissemination of bourgeois ideology in the USSR to be removed and the go-ahead for any slander of socialism and Marxism-Leninism to be given. L. Marks, chairman of the consultative commission for international enlightenment and culture, issued an overt call for "the USSR to be challenged on a specific question--the opening of all borders(!) for broader contacts among people and contacts in the information sphere."²¹ This call was so much to the liking of American "hawks" that one of them--Congressman P. Crane--proposed that the text of L. Marks' article be included in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

International law and the conventions, pacts and other highly important documents adopted within the UN framework regard fundamental human rights as a broad, all-embracing concept which incorporates political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights of entire peoples. Thus the international pact of economic, social and cultural rights begins with a proclamation of the right of all peoples to self-determination and the right freely to establish their own political status, freely to insure their own economic, social and cultural development and freely to control their own natural resources. Of course, all these inalienable rights of the peoples do not suit those who pursue the imperialist policy of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, impose antidemocratic regimes on them and stretch out their hands for their wealth.

The problem of insuring human rights is the problem of creating the conditions for the free development of all the peoples under conditions of peace and for the comprehensive harmonious blossoming of each human

individual. The solution of such a majestic task, which is permeated with the noble ideas of humanism, has nothing to do with political intrigues and propaganda rhetoric. The attempts by Washington figures to justify their actions by citing the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, let alone to represent themselves as fighters for its fulfillment, cannot be regarded as either valid or honest.

First, the chief aim of the Helsinki accords is to insure peace, security and cooperation among states and respect for their sovereignty and to make detente both a continuous and an increasingly comprehensive process. Any attempts to poison the international atmosphere, to undermine detente or to interfere in the internal affairs of other states run counter to the letter and the spirit of the final act.

Second, the so-called "third basket" cannot be artificially singled out of the broad complex of questions considered in the final act. The questions of war and peace which are of decisive importance for the fate of all the peoples and each person cannot be pushed somewhere into the political background.

Third, Section 3 itself of the final act cannot be approached selectively, extracting only certain questions from it. Incidentally, questions connected with human rights are by no means examined in Section 3 alone: they are formulated more fully in Section 1 which says, in particular, that the signatory states "will encourage and develop the effective implementation of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms which all stem from the dignity inherent in the human individual and are vital for its free and full development."

And of course the provisions of the final act cannot be interpreted arbitrarily and tendentiously, extracting a particular phrase from the general context of a document which represents a single whole.

For several years now the United States has been making attempts to impose its own extremely narrow concept of human rights on the whole world. In various UN organs American diplomacy has made special efforts aimed at excluding from this concept specific human rights in the socioeconomic sphere and the rights of ethnic groups of the population. These attempts are fundamentally at variance with the position of broad circles of the world public, as the appeal unanimously adopted in December 1973 at the conference of nongovernmental organizations which have consultative status in the UN Economic and Social Council testifies. The appeal, which is entitled "The Next 25 Years of the General Declaration of Human Rights," notes that "as has been admitted, civil and political rights alone do not insure the dignity and freedom of the individual."²² At the same time the appeal stresses states' obligation to insure human rights in the economic, social and cultural spheres.

The U.S. Congress has appointed a commission to "monitor" the fulfillment of the final act as an instrument for interference in the socialist

countries' internal affairs. According to Congressman R. Drinan, the commission will enable the United States to "act on behalf (!) of the peoples" of the socialist countries.²³ Another congressman--R. Sarasin--proposed that the human rights issue be utilized for inflammatory, anti-state activity in the socialist countries and that political conditions be imposed on them by means of trade and economic levers.²⁴ These and other statements by American legislators eloquently attest that, in talking of human rights, they are proceeding not from humanist considerations but from a purely pragmatic task--to undermine the social system which exists in the socialist countries. This policy line runs irreconcilably counter to the principles of the final act.

The organizers of the campaign about "human rights violations" in the socialist countries assert that their actions are perfectly compatible with the policy of the relaxation of international tension. If this is really the case, how is the unanimous support for these actions on the part of the fiercest opponents of detente in general and of the decisions of the Helsinki conference in particular to be explained? The whole point is that reactionary forces regard the ballyhoo surrounding human rights "violations" in the socialist countries as a means of undermining the policy of the relaxation of international tension. They would like to erase everything positive that has been achieved in the last few years.

Washington's attempts to interfere in the USSR's internal affairs in violation of the final act and of the bilateral Soviet-American agreements are having a negative effect on the relations between the two states and on the international situation as a whole. Certain American figures assert that the "human rights" campaign and the successful development of interstate relations can be implemented "in parallel." But in the real context of international relations both questions are interconnected. As USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko has stressed, "everything that has been said about 'human rights' lately in the United States...of course, poisons the atmosphere and worsens the political climate. And does this help solve other questions, including questions relating to strategic weapons? No, it does not help. On the contrary, it hinders."²⁵

The U.S. position has repeatedly been criticized in UN circles, as it has, incidentally, by a considerable part of the American public. (R. Hauser), former U.S. representative in the UN Human Rights Commission, said, speaking in a congressional subcommittee: "I would not be telling the whole truth if I did not warn: We must prepare to come up against criticism of our position in the human rights sphere from other countries in the United Nations."²⁶

The picture would be incomplete if we did not dwell on one of the official purposes of Washington's campaign surrounding "human rights"--to ward off criticism of itself and to distract the attention of the world and the American public from the blatant violation of these rights in the United States itself: in the social and economic as well as in the political and civil spheres.

An English proverb says: People who live in glass houses should not throw stones. Profound social inequality, brutal capitalist exploitation, unemployment, racial discrimination, the inequality of women, the persecution of dissidents, the increase in crime, the corruption permeating every level of the state apparatus--all this by no means makes the United States a yardstick of democracy and social justice.

It scarcely needs to be proved that the most important of fundamental human rights is the right to work. The task of insuring full employment was enshrined in the UN Charter (Article 55). The right of every person to work was also proclaimed in 1948 in the General Declaration of Human Rights (Article 23). It is significant that the list of individual rights in the international pact on economic, social and cultural rights starts precisely with the right to work. It can be added that the American Declaration of Human Rights and Duties (adopted at the ninth conference of American states in Bogota in 1948) also says that "every person has the right to work in suitable conditions."²⁷

However, the United States has never fulfilled this most important provision in the human rights sphere. Nor has it fulfilled its own employment law of 1946 which proclaimed the policy of insuring employment for all people who "are able and want to work and are seeking work." This law, according to CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, "has remained on paper only for more than 30 years."²⁸ The number of unemployed Americans is now millions and millions.

The fact that the unemployed receive benefits for a period does not save them from serious material difficulties or from demoralizing experiences. This is acknowledged in the Democratic Party's election platform which says: "Unemployment instills in people inner anxiety and fear as a result of unpaid bills, leaves them with time on their hands, causes them to lose their sense of personal dignity and causes strained relations in the family; hardship for children and young people; alcoholism; drug addiction; and crime. Work is one of the chief criteria which determine man's place in society and it shows whether he is a full-fledged member of society or whether he feels superfluous."²⁹ You have to agree with this. But if the issue is approached with this criterion in mind, it has to be acknowledged that the United States has deprived and is depriving millions of citizens of the right to be full-fledged members of society.

Another important social right of every individual is the right to essential medical assistance. Without it man's right to live is undermined and all his other rights are rendered meaningless. Recognizing the significance of health protection in the life of society, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed the right of each individual to medical care. However, in the United States, where medicine is a source of profit, a considerable proportion of the population is unable to obtain essential medical assistance. Both bourgeois parties have repeatedly been forced to admit this fact.

There is still discrimination against women in all spheres of life in the United States. The authorities' symbolic actions (for example, the appointment of a few women to government posts) do not fundamentally affect the unequal status of American women. Discrimination against them is all-embracing and obvious, and this is admitted by both parties. The Republicans state that "women are deprived of a considerable number of rights and opportunities." Democrats have made the same admissions about continuing discrimination against women.

Finally, Americans' political and civil rights are being violated on a grand scale. The promulgation of antidemocratic laws, police tyranny, the use of the police and armed forces to disperse demonstrations and rallies, phony trials, blacklisting and dismissals from work, total surveillance and other secret operations by the FBI, CIA and similar departments--the entire arsenal of methods is used by the state to combat dissidents and to undermine mass social protest movements. There are numerous data on the violation of Americans' democratic rights in the materials of the Princeton University conference on the FBI's activity³⁰ and in the investigation by J. Berman and M. Halperin³¹ and many other works. Under public pressure, the authorities made public certain information about the activity of the FBI, the CIA and other departments in a report by a special Senate committee headed by F. Church.³² Extra light was thrown on the antidemocratic activity of this "intelligence community" by the hushed-up report of the House Special Committee published by the VILLAGE VOICE.³³ The figures cited by the Senate special committee to investigate that activity of intelligence organs gives an idea of the scale of these violations of millions of Americans' elementary democratic rights and freedoms. According to these figures, more than 500,000 files, based on agents' information, are kept in FBI headquarters. The number of files is constantly increasing. As a rule each file contains information on several persons, on groups or organizations; therefore the number of Americans under constant FBI headquarters control runs into many millions. Moreover, an enormous number of files is kept by local FBI branches throughout the country.³⁴

During the period 1955 through 1975 the FBI investigated 740,000 cases of "subversive activity" and 190,000 cases of "extremism." In addition to using electronic and other technical facilities the FBI maintains a whole army of paid informers and provocateurs. In 1972 it employed more than 7,000 sleuths in Negro areas alone. In 1976 the FBI spent twice as much in the payment of agents shadowing dissidents as it did on the gathering of information on organized crime. The shadowing of Americans inside the United States is being carried out simultaneously by the CIA. It has built up a card index on 300,000 Americans. Moreover, during operation "Chaos" against progressive and democratic organizations in 1967-1973 the CIA compiled dossiers on 7,200 American citizens and over 100 public organizations. Over a period of 20 years the CIA has opened and photographed more than 215,000 letters from people writing from the USSR to the United States or sent by Americans to the Soviet Union.³⁵ Other departments

engage in the inspection of correspondence. By secret agreement with three major telegraph companies the National Security Agency opened millions of private telegrams between 1947 and 1975. Between 1940 and 1966 the FBI opened and photographed at least 130,000 letters in eight U.S. cities alone. The military department has also stepped up its surveillance of American citizens. Since the mid-sixties army intelligence has compiled dossiers on 100,000 Americans.³⁶

All these are the conventional methods used by punitive and repressive state organs on a permanent basis in the United States. During periods when there is an upsurge in the masses' struggle in defense of their rights and needs, the bourgeois state openly resorts to violent methods and dispenses with the pretense of legality. In the sixties, Washington, Chicago, Birmingham, Selma and other cities became arenas of police outrages, brutality and mass arrests of participants in antiwar meetings and demonstrations and civil rights fighters. The real value of the constitutional right to "peaceful assembly" (enshrined in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) was fully revealed at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies. In 1968 the Chicago police, on instructions from the city's Mayor Daley, a prominent Democratic Party figure, perpetrated savage reprisals against the participants of youth demonstrations. In 1969 the police arrested 4,000 students, and police detachments and units of the National Guard occupied university campuses 127 times. In May 1970 national guardsmen opened fire on a crowd of Kent State University students, killing four of them. None of the guardsmen was convicted of the crime; on the contrary, 25 students were brought to court.

At the time some politicians were calling for a further escalation of violence against dissidents. According to press reports, they included J. Carter. THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote in this connection: "Speaking at campuses, E. McCarthy (former American senator and liberal--I.G.) invariably recalls that following the reprisals on the Kent State University campus in Ohio in 1970 Carter, who was governor of Georgia at the time, said that the guard ought to be given live ammunition and ordered to shoot to kill if student riots broke out again."³⁷ This report was not denied.

A few weeks after the tragedy at Kent State, guardsmen again opened fire on students at Jackson University and blood was shed once more. In May 1971 the police arrested around 13,000 people who had come to Washington to protest against the American aggression in Vietnam.

The authorities are also implementing carefully prepared operations on the liquidation of undesirables. One such criminal act, organized by the FBI, was the heinous murder of Fred Hampton, Mark Clark and other fighters for black people's rights. They were shot during a raid in which the police opened fire on people asleep in their beds.

Certain secret operations by the CIA, FBI and other departments in violation of American citizens' constitutional rights have become public

knowledge in recent years. Washington tries to give the impression that these violations are all in the past. There has been no shortage of official assurances about measures which have put a stop to the abuses. Such statements have been made before in the United States. Today, however, as in the past, the widely publicized "reforms" of the intelligence community are purely cosmetic in nature. They amount to the removal of the most compromised officials and trifling administrative changes. Not a single part of the vast intelligence and repressive-punitive machine has been dismantled. It remains intact and untouched, right down to the last screw. The authors of the collective work "The Lawless State," which was published recently in the United States, have every justification for writing: "There is the danger that with the Watergate affair over and the official investigation into intelligence organs completed the country is being lulled by assurances that the compilation of a catalog of violations perpetrated in the past will, of itself, solve future problems. This is not the case, however: Exposures and reforms are two different things."³⁸

Indicative in this respect is the fate of the "cointelpro" program which the FBI began to implement in 1956. The program's aim was to discredit, undermine and break up the Communist Party and a number of democratic organizations. What happened to this program after the public learned about it? "All available data convincingly show," the authors of "The Lawless State" write, "that operations connected with the 'cointelpro' program are continuing under different names. A directive from the Department of Justice sanctions many abuses of the past. The FBI is still able to cloak its activity in secrecy. It still has extensive files and there is still the threat that it might use blackmail and other methods."³⁹ The CIA, military intelligence, the National Security Agency and other departments are also continuing many of their operations inside the United States.

As before, phony trials of fighters for Americans' political and social rights are being staged. Recently, the "Wilmington Ten," (Assat Shakur) and many others have been victims of arbitrary legal measures.

The authorities have no intention of abandoning mass arrests as a means of suppressing actions of social protest. This was essentially admitted by President Carter himself at a press conference 9 March, although he specified that such measures should be resorted to only under "exceptional circumstances."

The U.S. refusal to subscribe to very important international law documents on questions of human rights and freedoms is further evidence of the hypocritical nature of Washington's claim to the role of supreme arbiter and world mentor on the human rights issue. The United States has not yet ratified the International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights. The United States has also refused to subscribe to the International Convention on the Liquidation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (it was adopted by the UN

General Assembly in 1965, entered into force in 1969 and is supported by 93 states). It is easy to see what the American legislators do not like about the convention. For example, it demands that all the participating states do away with segregation and all racial barriers (Article 2). However, recent figures show that segregation in U.S. schools is scarcely declining (in the northeast it is increasing); discrimination against blacks is practiced in the widest possible scale in the housing sphere and the hiring of labor.

The convention demands that the propagation of racist ideas and incitement to racial discrimination be declared a crime punishable by law and that all organizations engaged in such activity be prohibited. In the United States, however, there are no restrictions either on the propaganda of racist ideas or on the activity of racist pogrom organizations like the Ku Klux Klan.

There is no evidence that Washington intends to adopt effective measures to liquidate discrimination against black Americans, Indians or other ethnic groups in all spheres of life. It is no accident that the United States has not supported the program for a decade of struggle against racism and racial discrimination proclaimed by the United Nations (1973-1983).

The United States has not even ratified the international convention on preventing the crime of genocide and on punishment for it which, to quote Morris Abram, former U.S. representative to the UN Human Rights Commission, is "the fundamental basis of policy in the sphere of human rights."⁴⁰ This convention was adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, and it was in 1949 that President Truman sent it to the Senate for ratification. It was January 1974, that is, almost a quarter-century later, before the Senate began to discuss it at sessions. Many senators did not conceal the reasons for their negative attitude toward this document: In their view, ethnic minorities in the United States could accuse the American authorities of violating the provisions of the convention. Apart from everything else, Senator S. Ervin anxiously noted, the American Armed Forces could be accused of pursuing a policy of genocide in respect to the peoples of other countries.⁴¹ In short, the United States has not yet ratified the convention on genocide which has already been subscribed to by more than 80 states.

By refusing to subscribe to the very important international law documents on human rights the United States is not only depriving itself of the legal basis for aspiring to the role of defender of these human rights--it is violating the commitments it has assumed under the UN Charter.

President Carter recently appealed to the U.S. Senate to ratify some of these documents. Past U.S. presidents have made many similar appeals to Congress. But matters remain at a standstill. The future will show whether Congress' position will change. In one way or another it remains

a fact that the real conditions of life in the United States and the activity of state organs patently contradict the very important provisions of these documents.

Adhering as it does to the principle of noninterference in other countries' internal affairs, the Soviet Union has never demanded that the United States effect any changes in its internal procedures as a condition of the development of Soviet-American relations. But, at the same time, the USSR resolutely rejects any attempts to interfere in its affairs.

The Soviet side has something to say about human rights. For the first time in history Great October brought about the true emancipation of the human individual. Socialism is the society of real humanism and genuine democracy. Socialism liquidates all types of oppression, insures the right to work, education and leisure and full employment for working people and creates real opportunities for the comprehensive creative growth of all members of society.

The profound changes which have taken place in our society over the past 40 years are reflected in the draft of the new USSR Constitution. "...The main direction of the innovations contained in the draft," L. I. Brezhnev noted in his report at the 24 May CPSU Central Committee plenum, "is the broadening and deepening of socialist democracy."⁴² It is in this direction that the draft further develops the principles of the formation and activity of soviets of all levels as the political basis of the socialist state. The draft's broad elaboration of provisions on the rights of Soviet citizens, including their socioeconomic rights, civil rights and freedoms, in addition to their duties to the state and to the people, proceeds in this very same direction.

Our new constitution, Comrade Brezhnev stressed, will graphically demonstrate to the whole world the way the socialist state is developing, making socialist democracy ever stronger and ever deeper, and will graphically show what this socialist democracy is and the nature of its essence.

In politics, V. I. Lenin wrote, you have to learn to look behind all the moral, religious, political and social phrases, statements and promises for the interests of particular classes. This fully applies to Washington's current campaign in "defense of human rights." It meets the selfish interests of those U.S. circles who are seeking to undermine the positive development of Soviet-American relations and the policy of detente as a whole. In this sense Washington's campaign about imaginary violations of human rights in the socialist countries is evidence of the political weakness of imperialism and of attempts to compensate for its inability to advance an attractive social ideal by slandering real socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Facts on File," 21 January 1977, p 27.
2. Ibid., 25 September 1976, p 704.
3. "Weekly Compilation Report of the Presidential Documents," No 12, 1977, p 397.
4. "The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg," edited by A. Vandenberg, Jr., Boston, 1952, p 267.
5. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1973, p 709.
6. G. Gordon and I. Falk, "The War of Ideas: America's International Identity Crisis," New York, 1973, p 169.
7. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 12 July 1976, pp 1, 924.
8. PARADE, 30 November 1975, p 4.
9. SOCIAL RESEARCH, Winter 1975, Vol 42, p 760.
10. THE WASHINGTON POST, 5 September 1976.
11. D. Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," New York, 1976, p 233.
12. Ibid., p 235.
13. "The Crisis of Democracy," Trilateral Task Force on the Governability of Democracies, rapporteurs, M. Crozier, J. Huntington, J. Wataniki, New York, 1975.
14. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1973, p 722.
15. "Pacem in Terris," Vol IV, Washington, 1976, p 109.
16. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 17 July 1976, pp 1, 935.
17. In particular, Prof A. Schlesinger, President Kennedy's former assistant, has written openly about this. Stressing that the "fundamental problem" facing Washington is the "restoration of a reasonable national consensus," he specified: "The restoration of such a consensus is the precondition for solving foreign policy problems." (FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1976, p 19)
18. "Facts on File," 21 January 1977, p 27.

19. FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1976, p 82.
20. W. Watts and L. Free, "State of the Nation 1974," Washington, 1974, p 261.
21. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 9 August 1976, p E4425.
22. "International Protection of Human Rights, the Work of International Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy." Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, 1974, p 776.
23. "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Part II." Hearings before the Committee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, 1976, p 80.
24. Ibid., p 86.
25. PRAVDA, 1 April 1977.
26. "25th Anniversary of the United Nations." Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, 1970, p 197.
27. International Human Rights. Selected Declarations and Agreements. Washington, 1976, p 41.
28. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 15 May 1976, p 1172.
29. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 17 July 1976, p 1913.
30. "Investigating the FBI," edited by P. Watters and S. Gillers, New York, 1973.
31. "The Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies," edited by J. Berman and M. Halperin.
32. "Intelligence Activities and Rights of Americans, Book II. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities," U.S. Senate, Washington, 1976.
33. VILLAGE VOICE, 16 February 1976.
34. "Intelligence Activities and Rights of Americans, Book II," p 6.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.

37. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 25 October 1976.
38. M. Halperin, J. Berman, R. Borosage, C. Marwick, "The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies," Dallas, 1976, p 239.
39. Ibid., p 242.
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41. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 9 February 1974, p 316.
42. PRAVDA, 5 June 1977.

CSO: 1803

PROBLEMS OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 22-33 LD

[Article by A. K. Kislov]

[Text] The great attention devoted by the CPSU and the Soviet Government to relations between the USSR and the United States is quite understandable. "There are great objective possibilities for the further development of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation in various spheres for the good of both countries and of universal peace," L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted recently.¹ He called "concerted actions by our countries with the aim of achieving a just and stable peaceful settlement in the² Near East" one of the specific and quite realistic tasks in this respect.

This formulation of the question is no accident. The Near East conflict has a special position among the international problems to which a solution is urgently needed. There is perhaps no other single region in the world where a crisis condition has remained a permanent fixture, assuming first exceptionally acute and then slightly less dangerous forms throughout the whole postwar period, during which the Near East has four times become an arena of wars: Nor has it known peace in the intervals between large-scale combat operations. Even legally the Arab countries and Israel are still in a state of war, since only ceasefire agreements exist and have existed between them. This position seems especially anomalous against the background of the generally positive changes in the international arena which we have witnessed in the seventies.

As historical experience shows, in those unfortunately still rare cases when it has been possible in the Near East to gain at least some easing of tension and elimination of the most immediate consequences of the latest war, this has come about through joint or parallel steps, not contradicting each other, by the USSR and United States. In this context it is worth remembering the joint Soviet-American initiative drawn up in Moscow and supported by other states which secured the possibility of a cease fire in the Near East in October 1973.

The number of examples of such joint or parallel actions by the USSR and United States in the Near East is, however, extremely limited, although it is well known that over 20 years ago, in February 1957--that is, soon after the triple aggression against Egypt--the Soviet Government in special notes to the U.S., British and French governments appealed to these states to make joint efforts to insure stable and lasting peace in the Near East and to draw up an³ appropriate joint declaration or individual but identical declarations. The reluctance of the Western powers, and primarily of the United States, not only to accept the Soviet proposals on the fundamental principles of such documents, but even in essence to discuss it or to proffer any counterproposals of their own largely promoted the transformation of the Near East into one of the most dangerous hotbeds of international tension. "There is now no war in the Near East. But neither is there peace there, much less tranquility. And who will dare to guarantee that the flames of military operations will not flare up afresh?"⁴

It is precisely for this reason that the Near East attracts such constant attention both from the world public as a whole and from state figures of various countries, which is evidenced by an appreciable intensification of diplomatic activity in and around the Near East in recent months. However, this activity has not yet led to any cardinal positive advances in the real state of affairs. Israeli troops continue to boss the show in the Arab territories they occupied 10 years ago. The Arab people of Palestine, whom they are trying to keep in the position of an exiled people, are still deprived of their legitimate rights. Other problems remain unresolved (in particular the continuing state of war between the Arab countries and Israel), without whose solution there is not and cannot be peace in the Near East.

As a result, the situation in this region of the world is extremely precarious and unstable and the threat of another Arab-Israeli war starting has not been removed. "If," M. Vilner, secretary general of the Communist Party of Israel, has quite rightly stressed, "the danger of a fifth such war still exists, the reason is not that anyone is threatening Israel's existence, but that the circles in power (in Israel--A.K.) desire territorial expansion, and because of their surprisingly stubborn reluctance to acknowledge the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine and refusal to hold any talks at all with their competent, recognized and sole national representative--the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO]. Rejecting talks with the PLO is equivalent to refusing dialog with the Arab people of Palestine, and refusing such dialog means opposing the establishment of peace and moving matters toward another war."⁵

It is now increasingly widely understood that in the Near East there cannot and will not be peace until the causes of the Near East conflict are removed--Israel's occupation of Arab territories seized as a result of aggression; the deprivation of the Arab people of Palestine of their inalienable rights; the continuing state of war between Israel and the Arab countries--and that all these problems can only be resolved on the

basis of an all-embracing political settlement which takes into account the legitimate rights and interests of all sides directly involved in the conflict. These are the Arab states, the Palestinian Arab people, and the state of Israel. All sides, naturally on equal terms, must participate in the actual settlement process. Since such complex and intertwined problems can only be resolved in a package, the desire to exclude even one of the directly interested sides from their solution creates a direct threat to the cause of peace. No partial steps or separate attempts embracing only individual participants in the conflict to extinguish this or that single hotbed of military clashes in the Near East or to resolve this or that partial problem are able to defuse the extremely explosive situation in that region.

As for a forum which could tackle an all-embracing political settlement of the Near East conflict, this forum--the Geneva Peace Conference on the Near East--has been created by a special UN decision and has been recognized as politically acceptable by all the interested sides. The urgent necessity to renew its work in a short time was also stressed during the UN Security Council's March 1977 examination of the question of the situation in that region of the world.

It is well known that the USSR and the United States are cochairman of this conference, and a comparison of their positions on the problems of a Near East settlement is of great interest.

The Soviet Union invariably and consistently strives for the establishment of just and lasting peace in the Near East, persistently seeking to insure that peace and tranquility reign there and that the consequences of Israeli aggression are eliminated. "We advocate a radical settlement," L. I. Brezhnev stressed on 18 April, speaking on the arrival in Moscow of a Syrian party and governmental delegation. "Our proposals on this score are balanced, and above all, honest proposals."

In their most condensed form the proposals from the USSR, which is not only cochairman of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Near East but also a state in close proximity to this region, consist of the following:

"...The final document (or documents) on peace in the Near East must be based on the principle of the impermissibility of acquiring territory through wars and the right of all states in this region to independent existence and security. Of course the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people must be insured, including their right to self-determination and to create their own state.

"...The peace documents must provide for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

"...We proceed from the premise that from the moment of the completion of the withdrawal of Israeli forces the state of war between the Arab participant states in the conflict and Israel will end and peaceful relations will be established.

"...Fulfillment of the conditions of the peace settlement could, in our opinion, be guaranteed--if the contracting parties so desired--by the UN Security Council or perhaps also by individual powers, for example the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Britain."

The objective, principled and genuinely balanced nature of the USSR's approach to resolving the problem of a Near East settlement was noted, in particular, during the UN Security Council examination already mentioned of the question on the situation in the Near East. Warm gratitude to the USSR for its consistent support for the Arab peoples' struggle for a settlement of the Near East conflict, particularly highlighting the corresponding proposals advanced in L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the congress of USSR trade unions, was expressed during the April 1977 Moscow visit of a PLO delegation by Yasir Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. The USSR's efforts to establish just peace in the Near East also received a high appraisal from Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, who was in Moscow at the head of a Syrian party and government delegation in spring this year.

The Soviet Union has not only formulated the fundamental ideas regarding the principles on whose basis, in its opinion, it is possible to achieve just and lasting peace in the Near East, but has also proposed a specific and constructive plan for their implementation.

Thus, developing the provisions of the well-known UN Security Council resolutions on the need for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied by them as a result of their aggression in 1967, the USSR has expressed the opinion that this withdrawal could be carried out not immediately but in stages, over a period of several months, for example, but within strictly defined deadlines.

The fundamental difference between this approach to solving the problem and the so-called "stage-by-stage diplomacy" or "diplomacy of partial steps" which U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger pursued so actively in the Near East lies in the fact that the latter's aim was to conclude between Arab countries on the one hand and Israel on the other separate deals which were not related to an all-embracing settlement of the Near East conflict and did not even envisage any specific deadlines for the implementation of the given aim.

The Soviet proposals further envisage the necessity to declare finally established and inviolable precisely defined (precisely indeed, and not in any unclear form permitting different interpretations) borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Here all the sides must adopt mutual

commitments to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability and political independence and to solve international disputes by peaceful means. Simultaneously a system of means is proposed which could truly effectively insure genuine security of the borders of Near Eastern states. They include, for example, the creation by agreement between the appropriate states of demilitarized zones on both sides of the established borders in such a way that no one would obtain any unilateral advantages. Either special UN Armed Forces or their observers could be stationed inside such zones for a strictly determined period of time.

Bearing in mind the great importance of the international waterways in the Near East region and the fact that disputes over their use have repeatedly been the pretext to justify aggressive actions by Israel, the USSR believes it necessary to resolve this problem once and for all in the all-embracing Near East settlement. On this question, too, the Soviet proposals proceed from the principle of observance of the sovereign rights and legitimate interests of all states. While far from imposing its own viewpoint on this or that Near Eastern country, the Soviet Union has at the same time considered it useful to propose that the final documents on peace in the Near East also contain provision for the free passage of ships of all countries, including Israel (after the ending of the state of war), through the Tiran Strait and the Gulf of Aqaba and also an Egyptian statement on the passage of ships through the Suez Canal, which is wholly under Egyptian sovereignty.

The Soviet Union here takes a flexible and constructive position with regard to the examination of all proposals aimed at a genuine settlement of the Near East problem which may be made by other interested sides.

It is the USSR's firm belief that the Geneva Peace Conference on the Near East is the sole forum for their discussion. Proceeding from the premise that precise definition of the circle of questions to be discussed among the sides is an important factor in the success of any international conference, in October 1976 the Soviet Union submitted the following considerations on the agenda for examination by its participants:

- "1. Withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied in 1967.
- "2. Implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their right to self-determination and the creation of their own state.
- "3. Insuring the right to independent existence and security for all the states directly involved in the conflict--the Arab states which are Israel's neighbors on the one hand and the state of Israel on the other--and the granting of corresponding international guarantees to them.

"4. Ending the state of war between the relevant Arab countries and Israel."⁸

The proposed agenda embraces all key aspects of a Near East settlement and forms a healthy foundation for talks, since it considers the legitimate rights and interests of all sides directly involved in the conflict.

This basis is just for the Arab states, since it provides for the return of all territories belonging to them without any reservations and eliminates the permanent threat of fresh aggression from Israel, which will allow them to concentrate their efforts on economic and social development and on eliminating the legacy of the colonial past.

It is just for the Palestinian Arab people, since it opens up for them the prospect of changing from an exiled people, a considerable proportion of whom are moreover suffering oppression from the occupiers, into a nation with equal rights and the opportunity to build their own statehood in their own homeland.

This agenda for the Geneva peace conference's work is also just for Israel, since the resolution of all the questions in it will insure for Israel, for the first time since its creation, the opportunity to turn from a "garrison state" living under conditions of either preparations for wars or actual wars into a normal state existing within recognized borders and enjoying all the benefits of peace and security. Only by firmly putting an end to its policy of expansion and aggression will Israel receive the opportunity to normalize its position among the states of the world and will its people be able to have confidence in the future.

Convening the Geneva conference is of course not an end in itself in the opinion of the Soviet Union. It cannot and must not be used as an instrument for giving international legitimacy to separate deals achieved by side-stepping the relevant decisions of the United Nations and other international forums. The main thing is for this conference's work to bring fruitful and just results. For this, first, as the USSR has invariably advocated, it is essential for all directly interested sides to participate in it, including PLO representatives. Secondly, its success of conceivable without certain preparations.

Bearing this in mind, in its 29 April 1976 statement the Soviet Government proposed that the conference's work be organized in two stages. In the initial phase all organizational questions which arise could be resolved, including the final agreement on the agenda, determination of the order of examining specific aspects of the settlement, and the possibility of setting up appropriate working organs, and so forth. After this it would be possible to move to the principal task--finding specific solutions for Near East problems and drawing up agreements on them. The principal stage of the conference must be completed by the adoption of a concluding document (or documents) in the nature of a treaty.

Although drawing up the conditions for peace in the Near East in all their details is primarily the affair of the conflicting sides themselves, the positive contribution being made to this process by the constructive and balanced ideas on the main principles and channels for a future all-embracing peaceful settlement in the Near East formulated by the Soviet Union cannot be underestimated.

What is the position on all these questions of the United States, the other cochairman of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Near East?

Many declarations of readiness to promote the achievement of peace in the Near East in every possible way have already been made by the new Democratic administration which entered the White House on 20 January 1977. "Concerning foreign affairs," President J. Carter said on 25 March 1977 in conversation with a group of American editors, "we believe at least that 1977 will bring unique opportunities to achieve progress in the Near East.... I believe that the United States is ready this year to give great attention to this most important problem. I am personally ready to do this, and the State Department and my personal assistants are also ready to do this."¹⁰

"The impasse in the search for a settlement to the continuing conflict in the Near East," U.S. permanent representative at the United Nations, A Young stated at the 29 March 1977 Security Council session, "does not meet U.S. interests. Therefore, our government will continue energetically and creatively to assist the interested sides to move at the highest possible speed in accordance with the principle that none of us will achieve anything unless universal efforts are made and this is done with universal agreement.... We are firmly convinced as never before of the importance of achieving further progress on the path to establishing peace through the speediest resumption of the work of the Near East peace conference."¹¹

However, mere statements of good intentions, with which, as it is said, the road to hell is paved, are clearly insufficient. They must be followed by specific actions in full accordance with the words about U.S. readiness to get down to a genuine all-embracing settlement of one of the most protracted and complex international conflicts.

Assurances that an all-embracing Near East settlement, including "close contact" with the Soviet Union, is desired and also that the Geneva peace conference must play an "important role" in this process were also repeatedly heard from the lips of spokesmen of the preceding Republican administration. Moreover, the results of H. Kissinger's activity in the Near East were described by official Washington as virtually the greatest contribution to the cause of peace. Former U.S. President G. Ford without false modesty even called them "undoubtedly one of the greatest historical successes in the present decade and maybe even this century" by American diplomacy, of "enormous importance not only for the sides directly interested, but also for the whole world."¹²

How far do such appraisals accord with actual reality? What are the specific results of H. Kissinger's activity in the Near East in terms of promoting the establishment of a just and lasting peace in that region of the globe?

As is well known, the results of 2 years of "shuttle diplomacy" by the former U.S. secretary of state were enshrined in two Egyptian-Israeli agreements on separation of forces on the Sinai Peninsula and in the Syrian-Israeli agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from part of the Syrian territory occupied by them and on the determination of the schedule of the separation of Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights.

What specific contribution have these agreements made to the solution of the main and focal issues in a Near East settlement?

The first question to arise is the territorial question, that is, the question of Israel's liberation of the Arab lands it occupied in 1967.

In this respect most of the propaganda racket was raised around the Egyptian-Israeli agreements which were not only reached with the direct participation of Washington but also provided for the virtual transformation of the United States into a direct party to them, adopting a broad range of military, economic and political commitments.¹³ On the basis of these agreements Israel continues to occupy 87.5 percent of the Sinai peninsula; 5.5 percent of its territory has been transferred to Egyptian control; and 7 percent is in the buffer zone between Egyptian and Israeli Armed Forces controlled by UN special forces. If the liberation of the Egyptian territories occupied 10 years ago continues at the same rate in the future, their total liberation would take at least decades, if not centuries. The Arab countries, which have repeatedly stated that their national territory cannot serve as a bargaining counter and that Israel must withdraw from all the territories it occupied in 1967, will scarcely agree to such a prospect.

While on the Sinai Peninsula the Israeli forces, nevertheless, have been forced to withdraw several dozen kilometers from the lines which they reached in June 1967, on the Syrian Golan Heights. This withdrawal has been measured in only a few kilometers, and on the West Bank of the River Jordan which they occupy the Israelis not only have not moved a single step, but of late they have even set up a number of new militarized settlements. That is how matters stand with the solution of the territorial question.

As for the Palestinian question--the question of insuring the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine and their right to self-determination, including the creation of an independent Palestinian state, if there have been changes in the U.S. approach to its solution as a result of H. Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" these changes have only been negative in character.

Israel's extremely unconstructive position both with regard to Palestinian representation at the Geneva Peace Conference on the Near East and also with regard to the creation of an Arab state on part of the territory of Palestine is well known. Tel Aviv is categorically against PLO participation in the Near East conference's work as an independent member with equal rights, although the PLO is recognized by the United Nations and other international organizations as the representative of the Arab people of Palestine. But how can the Palestinian problem be resolved without the participation of the Palestinians' legitimate representatives?

On the other hand Israel also rejects the very possibility of creating a "third" state on the territory of Palestine between Israel and Jordan, that is, an independent Arab Palestinian state, asserting that such a state would represent a threat to its existence.

This position not only contradicts the UN General Assembly decision of 29 November 1947, on whose basis Israel itself was created and which simultaneously envisaged the creation of an Arab state on Palestinian territory. It represents a blatant attempt to create new, additional obstacles in the path of a Near East settlement, which is impossible without satisfying the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

What position has American diplomacy adopted on the Palestinian issue? It became known from the "secret documents" relating to the agreement on the second separation of Egyptian and Israeli forces on the Sinai peninsula that the United States adopted a commitment "not to recognize the PLO and not to hold talks with it until it recognizes Israel's right to existence" (the question of recognition of this organization by Israel was not even posed); "to consult comprehensively and to try to coordinate with the Israeli Government its position on the given question and its strategy at the Geneva peace conference" and also with "regard to the participation of any other states" at any subsequent stage; "to make every effort for talks at this conference to be held essentially on a bilateral basis" (which, simply put, means striving to emasculate the Geneva peace conference's work in advance, and to turn it into a kind of screen for separate deals). Moreover, the United States gave assurance not only "not to participate in any efforts by third countries aimed at the examination of proposals which, in its and Israel's opinion, are to the detriment of Israel's interests," but even "to prevent others from undertaking anything in this direction."¹⁴

Consequently, the United States practically adopted unambiguous commitments to give every support to Israel's obstructionist course toward undermining any earnest attempts to resolve the Palestinian problem and to promote the creation of favorable conditions for the work of the Geneva peace conference.

Western propaganda did considerable work to present the activity of the former U.S. secretary of state as somehow promoting the easing of tension in that region of the world and progress on the path toward an all-embracing

settlement of the Near East conflict; nothing could be further from the truth than this assertion. In reality, without removing the most acute contradictions between Israel and the Arab countries and without making any advance in the resolution of the fundamental problems, Washington's "shuttle diplomacy" only promoted the deepening of the split in the Arab world itself with all its ensuing consequences, as the tragic events in Lebanon obviously confirm.

"The Lebanese crisis," the Soviet Union's proposal on a Near East settlement and on the Geneva peace conference stressed, "could not have arisen if an all-embracing political settlement had been implemented in the Near East. It is also indubitable that under the conditions of such a settlement or in circumstances when serious efforts were being made to reach one, it would have been easier to find a solution to the problems dividing this small Near Eastern country."¹⁵

The authors of American diplomacy have not only not proposed any constructive program for an all-embracing peaceful settlement in the Near East, but they have also opened up (as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, accompanied by U.S. commitments to substantially expand American military aid to Israel) a new round in the arms race in that region of the world, which by dint of the international logic of its development is already fraught with the most dangerous consequences even including the gradual transformation of the Near East region into a region of nuclear confrontation.

The ultimate futility of "shuttle diplomacy" was clear to many prominent American political figures and specialists even at the moment when it was being most extolled by Western propaganda. The report "Toward Peace in the Near East" prepared by a special research group of the Brookings Institution is noteworthy in this respect. Its authors (among them, incidentally, was Z. Brzezinski, President Carter's present adviser on national security questions) formulated one of its principal conclusions thus: The Egyptian-Israeli agreement reached as a result of H. Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" continues to leave the basic elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict essentially untouched. If attention is not given to these elements in the near future, growing tension in the region will lead to an increased risk of violent action. We believe that the best method to resolve these problems is the achievement of an all-embracing agreement."¹⁶

Current U.S. President J. Carter also sharply criticized the Near East policy of the Republican administration during the election campaign.

What position has the new Washington administration adopted on the focal questions of a Near East settlement? At the present stage it is not easy to give a simple answer to this question.

Concerning his public statements, especially on the Near East, President Carter himself said at a 24 March 1977 press conference: "It seems to me that if the statements I have made so far were analyzed in detail, they would not be so precisely formulated and not so specific as to prevent both participating sides from conducting talks honestly, without being bound by any program."¹⁷

Indeed many statements by the new White House boss about the Near East have often (and evidently consciously) been formulated in a way permitting them to be interpreted both this way and that. Some of them were clearly meant to gain the approval of Arab countries, and others of Israel. It must be supposed that all this was designed, in Washington's opinion, to give the appearance of a "balanced" U.S. approach to a Near East settlement, supposedly giving equal consideration to the interests of Israel and the Arab countries.

And this did not go without comment by the American press. "The president's unexpected statements on the question of a possible Arab-Israeli settlement were sufficiently balanced to raise hope and alarm in both camps¹⁸, the journal NEWSWEEK summed it up. On the whole "much is still unclear with regard to Carter's approach to the Near East problem," THE WASHINGTON POST stressed. "For example, he only mentioned the very important Palestinian issue in passing..."¹⁹ "President Carter's first personal plunge into the troubled waters of Near East politics," THE BALTIMORE SUN wrote in its turn, "was accompanied by a typical noisy splash. With the total disregard for traditional procedures and formulas which has already intrigued his compatriots, Carter dared to mention what is not normally mentioned publicly at a press conference in front of television cameras, and he contrived to do it ambiguously enough to leave himself a loophole for the future."²⁰

Nonetheless, some of the U.S. President's pronouncements have been quite definite, especially his statement that Washington supports the idea of "defensible borders" for Israel²¹, (At the 9 March press conference J. Carter explained his position as follows: "It is essential for the borders to be recognized by both sides.... In the foreseeable future the lines of defense (Israel's--A.K.) could coincide with these legal borders, or even not coincide with them. As for Israel's defensibility, it could extend beyond the limits of the permanent and recognized borders."²²

This statement, which aroused unconcealed satisfaction in Israel and criticism in even the most pro-American Arab circles, cannot be evaluated other than as direct support for Israel, which is refusing to withdraw its forces from all Arab territories occupied in 1967.

This appraisal has more than weighty foundations, and is confirmed by the president's closest associates. Thus in conversation with S. Dinitz, Israeli ambassador to Washington, Z. Brzezinski stated that in J. Carter's opinion the 1967 borders in the Near East are "dead" and that Israel "with the aim of insuring its security may have to retain a significant part of the Arab territory in a peaceful settlement." It was indicated here that the president believes that territorial changes in Israel's favor may extend for a distance of 20-50 km or more. And Israel's pullback to such borders may in the U.S. President's opinion take "2, 4, 8 years or even more."²³

But can such a situation, in which Arab lands would be under Israeli occupation another 2, 4, 8 or more years (not to mention attempts to give this occupation a "legitimate" character in the framework of a Near East settlement) continue without leading to another explosion in the Near East? Even the very idea of "defensible borders," in the form in which it is understood in Tel Aviv and Washington, threatens only (even irrespective of the dates of Israel's withdrawal to such borders) the further deepening and aggravation of the Near East crisis.

At the same time attention is also drawn to President J. Carter's statements that the United States must play "the role of a kind of catalyst" to make all sides in the Near East conflict "assemble in Geneva and begin talks with each other" as early as this year, and that he will devote "a significant part of his personal time to attempting to insure the organization of a forum at which the Near Eastern countries can discuss their problems and, if this can be managed, to insure for them the opportunity to agree among themselves on some kind of permanent solution."²⁴

Of course one must not underestimate the role the United States could play in the cause of a Near East settlement in the search for a healthy compromise acceptable to all the directly interested sides, without which there can naturally be no just and lasting settlement of such a protracted and complex international crisis. But this naturally does not mean that the key to the Near East settlement, as for example Egyptian President A. as-Sadat loves to repeat, "is 99 percent in the hands of the Americans."²⁵

Nevertheless, in any event the speed of a Near East settlement, and perhaps also the questions of war and peace in the Near East, depend on whether the United States, its role as cochairman of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Near East included, proceeds in its actions from the necessity for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression and for a positive solution to the Palestinian problem or continues to strive to encourage the aggressor.

The United States alone (whatever may be said on this score in Washington, Tel Aviv or Cairo) has been and is unable to resolve the Near East problem. But it is unquestionably able to make the already complex process of a Near East settlement even more difficult. The issue consequently is whether Washington's real policy corresponds to the assurances of its leadership.

It is precisely from this that the Soviet Union proceeds in setting the task of concerted actions by the USSR and United States in the Near East. Cooperation between the two cochairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Near East--genuine and real cooperation in keeping with the spirit of the document "Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the United States" signed 29 May 1972 in Moscow--would promote cardinal positive moves for a settlement in the Near East. "If both sides desired," L. I. Brezhnev noted, "they could do much to help the sides (in the Near East--A.K.) in the search for mutually acceptable solutions."²⁶

This approach by the USSR to this problem was reflected during U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance's visit to Moscow at the end of March this year. A thorough exchange of opinions on the problem of a Near East settlement was also held during the meeting between USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance in Geneva on 18-20 May. As the joint report on the results of these talks indicates, the sides reaffirmed that collaboration by the USSR and United States, as cochairs of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Near East, "is vitally important for the achievement of just, lasting and stable peace" in that region of the globe. Agreement was also reached to direct the joint efforts of both countries "toward resuming the conference's work during fall 1977, recognizing the importance of its careful preparation. To these ends the USSR and United States will hold monthly consultations at ambassadorial level in Moscow or Washington. They also agreed to act in this direction in their contacts with the sides directly involved in the Near East conflict." It was specially stressed here that "the elimination of the continuing hotbed of tension in the Near East is one of the primary tasks in the cause of insuring peace and international security."²⁷

How fully this specific and quite reasonable task will be implemented depends to a significant extent on the United States. As for the Soviet Union, the program it has advanced for a just political settlement of the Near East crisis opens up the broadest possible opportunities for this.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Soviet Trade Unions--an Influential Force in Our Society," Moscow, 1977, pp 22-23.
2. Ibid.
3. See "The Failure of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine,'" Moscow, 1958, pp 194-195.
4. "Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1976, p 14.
5. PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, No 4, 1977, p 22.
6. PRAVDA, 19 April 1977.
7. L. I. Brezhnev, "Soviet Trade Unions--an Influential Force in Our Society," pp 25-26.
8. PRAVDA, 2 October 1976.
9. See PRAVDA 29 April and 2 October 1976.
10. THE WASHINGTON POST, 26 March 1977.
11. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 March 1977.
12. "Weekly Compilation of the Presidential Documents," 8 September 1975, p 930.

13. The documents published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee relating to the agreement between Egypt and Israel signed 4 September 1975 on the second stage of the separation of Egyptian and Israeli forces on the Sinai Peninsula include a U.S. proposal to Egypt and Israel on setting up an early warning system and the stationing of American technical specialists in the buffer zone on the Sinai Peninsula, and also so-called secret documents: memorandums on an agreement between the Israeli and U.S. governments regarding American-Israeli assurances and the Geneva peace conference, assurances by the U.S. Government to Israel and assurances by the U.S. Government to Egypt.
14. "Early Warning System in Sinai," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 6-7 October 1975, Washington, 1975, pp 249-252.
15. PRAVDA, 2 October 1976.
16. "Toward Peace in the Middle East," Report of a Study Group, the Brookings Institution, Washington, 1975, p 1.
17. THE WASHINGTON POST, 25 March 1977.
18. NEWSWEEK, 21 March 1977, p 21.
19. THE WASHINGTON POST, 11 March 1977.
20. THE BALTIMORE SUN, 10 March 1977.
21. At the 9 March press conference J. Carter explained his position as follows: It is essential for the borders to be recognized by both sides.... In the foreseeable future the lines of defense (Israel's--A. K.) could coincide with these legal borders, or not even coincide with them. What is of concern here is the defense capability of Israel and that Israel can come out from behind the boundaries of permanent and recognized borders.
22. THE WASHINGTON POST, 10 March 1977.
23. THE WASHINGTON POST, 10, 22 March 1977.
24. THE WASHINGTON POST, 22 March 1977.
25. Mocking such assertions, the prominent Egyptian journalist and public figure M. Haykal quite rightly wrote: "If we Egyptians accept this, then all other factors including ourselves are worth only one single percent. This is absurd and is totally at variance with reality."
26. PRAVDA, 19 January 1977.
27. PRAVDA, 22 May 1977.

WHITE HOUSE ADVISORY STAFF

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 34-45

[Article by V. N. Orlov]

[Text] J. Carter's victory in the 1976 election began the process by which a new U.S. Administration was formed, although the contours of this administration had already been outlined during the election campaign. One announcement after another was issued on the appointment of individuals to cabinet posts, but until the day that he assumed this post, J. Carter delayed in making appointments to the presidential staff, which, incidentally, caused his closest assistants to reprimand him and "created an atmosphere of indecision and confusion."¹ At the same time, the press constantly underscored the President's interest in a recently published book by S. Hess, "Organizing the Presidency," the main conclusion of which suggested the need for the cabinet to play a more important role in the process of presidential decision-making.² It is not difficult to find an interconnection between these two facts. The new President of the United States, whose actions are generally given some kind of symbolic meaning by his fans, had declared several times during his campaign that he planned to rely on the cabinet, to reduce the White House staff and to basically reduce its role to the performance of auxiliary functions.

In American political practices of the last few decades, it has become traditional for new presidents to criticize the administrative style of their predecessors, particularly in regard to the political influence of the White House staff, which is increasing from administration to administration to the detriment of the cabinet. J. Carter had unique grounds for making these kinds of critical remarks during the pre-election interparty struggle and after his election victory, since he had promised to purge the government of all the filth of Watergate, and one of the main elements of the Watergate political scandal had been the misuse of power by presidential aides and the improper assumption of prerogatives by the White House staff.

But was there actually anything new about these events and were they actually characteristic of only R. Nixon's presidency? Historical facts indicate that the importance of the role played by individual components of the White House

advisory staff in the system of decision-making has varied during different periods, depending on a multiplicity of circumstances. In order to provide a better explanation of the mechanism governing the functioning of this staff, we will briefly describe its origination and development.

The present White House advisory system was established and developed mainly within the last 30-35 years, at a time when the entire governmental system of the United States was being reorganized and adapted to the new conditions of state-monopolistic regulation. The greater complexity and range of government functions led to a considerable increase in the staff of the executive branch, including the staff of the White House, the major link in the governmental mechanism.

The establishment and rapid growth of the advisory staff, exclusively serving the needs of the head of the executive branch, were determined by several factors. Firstly, the reinforcement of the regulatory function of the bourgeois government made it necessary for the president to make decisions on economic, scientific, technical, military and other matters requiring sound knowledge in special fields and, consequently, expert investigation. Secondly, the president needed a staff of his own to resist the pressure being exerted on him as part of the unending struggle between different groups within the ruling class, groups which search and find allies on various levels of the governmental machine. In S. Hess' words, this creates a "minority coalition" against the White House.³ Therefore, the president's advisers perform a dual function: On the one hand, they provide the president with information on various aspects of current problems and opposing views and, on the other, they reinforce the president's policies with expert authority and make them less vulnerable to criticism by his political opponents.

The time factor is also of great significance in the decision-making process. Due to the unwieldy size and unsystematic nature of the executive staff and Congress' love of delay, the president can rely only on the opinions of the White House advisory staff when decisions are to be made efficiently and speedily. For this same reason, past presidents have given their staffs the responsibility of overseeing new federal programs (particularly those of an interdepartmental nature), believing that transferring them over to departments and agencies would either halt their implementation or at least create long delays in their fulfillment.

It is also quite significant that many of the president's advisory councils and committees represent a convenient way of merging the federal system with the monopolistic system.

And this is not a complete list of the factors causing the growth of the president's staff, the size of which increased by 59.3 percent during 1955-1972 alone (the total increase in the executive staff as a whole was only 19.2 percent).⁴

As the current White House advisory system has taken shape, each president has made his own new additions. The basic stages in its development to date, however, have been connected with the names of three presidents--F. Roosevelt, H. Truman and R. Nixon.

In working out the strategy for the fight against the catastrophic aftereffects of the crisis of 1929-1933, Roosevelt was the first to involve representatives of academic circles in the development of government policy (the jocular term used to describe the president's group of learned academic advisers, the "brain trust," later became part of American political terminology). The government's heightened activity in the economic and social spheres did not fit into the existing framework of the federal mechanism, and Roosevelt was able to convince Congress of the need to establish the Executive Office of the President (EOP). Established in 1939, it became the basis of presidential authority and the basis of the superdepartmental staff of coordinative assistants and auxiliary counsels who were accountable only to the president.

Truman enlarged the White House staff set up by Roosevelt. His most important additions were the Council of Economic Advisers (1946) and the National Security Council (1947).

President R. Nixon proposed an extensive program for the comprehensive reorganization of the entire executive staff. Although he was not able to carry out this program in its entirety, significant changes were made in the presidential office during his first term, which concentrated more power in the White House. In particular, the Bureau of the Budget of the EOP was reorganized in 1970 as the Office of Management and Budget and was given a much broader range of functions.⁵ The Domestic Council was established at the same time. The Council on International Economic Policy was established in 1973. In carrying these reorganizational measures, Nixon followed a course aimed at the continuous introduction of private entrepreneurial methods of administration and principles of organization into the federal system.

Since the changes made in the presidential staff by President G. Ford were not of a radical nature, J. Carter inherited the organizational structure of presidential power which was basically set up during the Nixon Administration.

Of all the White House advisory agencies, only the cabinet is mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.⁶ But it is precisely this organ which has had the least influence on presidential policy to date. Although individual members of the cabinet can have a significant effect on the decisions made by the president (and not only in regard to matters within their area of expertise), most of the American presidents have preferred not to use the cabinet as a counseling board. To some extent, this has reflected the conflicts between the head of the executive branch and the federal bureaucracy. Despite the fact that the president appoints and dismisses cabinet members, they, as the heads of federal departments, fall under the influence of an unchanging part of the executive system with a great deal of political power. In view of

the fact that it is precisely the middle links of the bureaucracy that are responsible for all preparatory work on the development of federal policy and its practical implementation, cabinet members invariably become involved in the struggle between monopolistic "interest groups."

Some executive departments look to Congress as a "basis of support," since the financing of their programs depends on Congress. In turn, Congress looks for allies in the executive departments during its disputes with the president. This kind of alliance between the federal bureaucracy and Congress sometimes undermines presidential authority. If we also consider the fact that the permanent bureaucracy is the seat of interparty struggle and that it is relied upon by the party losing the presidential election, we can understand why many presidents do not trust the staff of the executive departments and try to neutralize the bureaucracy and concentrate power in the White House.

For 3 decades, the National Security Council (NSC), established in 1947, has been the president's main advisory organ on foreign and military policy. The history of the NSC's establishment and development and its organization and structure has been widely discussed in Soviet literature.⁷ From the standpoint of the role played by the NSC in the presidential mechanism, this organ was set up to neutralize the growing political influence of the top military circles somewhat and to preserve the president's constitutional status. At the same time, the structure of the NSC has indisputably restricted the president's freedom of action by making decisions on military and political matters contingent upon the compulsory participation of authorized representatives of the circles which later began to be called the military-industrial complex. The militaristic aims of the NSC and the Pentagon's control over foreign policy have characterized all of the actions of this organ. "The military aims of the NSC," says C. Yost, former U.S. representative to the UN, "almost inevitably gives unwarranted weight to military factors in the assessment of foreign policy matters, many of which would appear to be primarily political or economic in a different context."⁸

The NSC has gone through more than 600 sessions since the time of its establishment; these have varied greatly in terms of composition and procedures--from the extended plenums of the Eisenhower Administration, in which up to 60 individuals were involved, to the bare minimum staff (the so-called executive committee) of the NSC during the time of the Caribbean crisis; from the regularly convened formal meetings of the NSC during the first years of its existence to the convocation of the NSC from time to time during the Kennedy Administration and the replacement of the formal meeting procedures of the NSC with "breakfasts" with L. Johnson. Regardless of the form of NSC operations preferred by individual presidents, however, the important thing is that not a single significant decision on foreign policy has been made without the participation of the heads of the military establishment and intelligence agencies since 1947.

In recent years (particularly during the Kennedy and Nixon administrations), there has been a perceptible tendency toward reduced participation by federal foreign policy departments in the development of policy. This has

been accompanied by an increase in the influence of the president's national security adviser, who confers with the NSC staff during the time when foreign policy decisions are being considered and made.

Some changes were made in the NSC structure during Ford's term in the presidency, when the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the chief of the White House office on scientific policy were appointed advisers to the NSC in addition to the director of the CIA and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the scandalous exposure of the CIA's improper activities, Ford was forced to partially reorganize the intelligence mechanism in February 1976, tying it even more closely to the NSC system, that is, to the White House. The names of some of the NSC agencies were changed and the director of the CIA was given an even more important role as the president's chief assistant on matters concerning intelligence activity.

So far, J. Carter's actions have indicated that the NSC, headed by the President, will remain the most important organ involved in the development of foreign and military policy. Carter is evidently taking steps to enlarge this agency somewhat for the purpose of coordinating U.S. foreign policy more closely with domestic affairs and, in particular, economic affairs.⁹ The "NSC system," made up of seven interdepartmental committees, has been reduced to two by J. Carter and his national security adviser, Z. Brzezinski. At present, it consists of a policy committee and a special coordinating committee. The first is made up of the permanent members and advisers of the NSC, the secretary of the treasury, the President's national security adviser and representatives from concerned departments, depending on the matter being discussed. The post of committee chairman is not a permanent one and also depends on the agenda. The second committee--under the chairmanship of Z. Brzezinski--will deal with such diverse matters as international crises, secret intelligence operations and arms limitation policy.

Despite the assurances of the White House that the new national security adviser's style of work will not be a throwback to the "personal diplomacy" of H. Kissinger, Z. Brzezinski plays a quite important role in the NSC. He is a member of both committees of the NSC system, the chairman of one and the possible (depending on the agenda) head of the other as well. The somewhat reduced, but quite large staff of the NSC remains under his jurisdiction. The President himself was involved in the formation of this staff, which is responsible for "digesting" information received from the departments and proposing new ideas, and in the organization of its operations.¹⁰ In terms of functional characteristics, the NSC staff can be divided into the following groups: the group on global affairs, the group on "North-South" relations (with the developing countries), the group on European affairs, the group on Middle Eastern affairs, the group on Far Eastern affairs, the analytical policy group, the economic group and the group on intelligence. For the first time in its existence, the NSC has appointed a special press secretary and congressional liaison.¹¹

By tradition, the president's chief adviser on economic affairs has always been the secretary of the treasury. It has also always been a tradition for the president to appoint a successful millionaire to this post, which has always reflected the intimate alliance between the bourgeois government and capital.

Due to the expansion of the government's economic role, however, and the fact that the state and development of the national economy were increasingly becoming political matters, the president began to require advisory agencies which could help him in the development of economic policy. In addition to representatives of big business, economists began to serve as advisers and counsels to the president (particularly during the Roosevelt Administration). The establishment of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in 1946 was a definite step in the process by which science was being placed at the service of the government, providing a formal structure for this kind of counseling.¹² The establishment of the CEA put bourgeois science at the service of government economic policy for the first time in the search for new forms and methods of state-monopolistic regulation.

The three members of the CEA appointed by the president and their staff of assistants (around 30 economists and statisticians) analyze the state of the U.S. economy and periodically compile reports for the president; at the beginning of each year, they compile the final analytical report which is submitted to Congress along with the economic report of the president.

Now that economic affairs are playing a more important role in government policy, the development of economic policy is becoming a political function, particularly in view of the conflict of interests within the ruling class. This is precisely the reason for the recent tendency toward the creation of a more extensive and complex advisory mechanism in the economic sphere. The president's chief advisers on economic policy--the "economic tsars" as they have been called by the press--have been J. Connally, G. Shultz and W. Simon, all secretaries of the treasury; the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has gained greater political influence by being included among the president's chief advisers. Advisers on economic affairs who are unconnected with the CEA have been appointed to the presidential staff. New counseling agencies have been established by the White House.

The Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) was established in January 1971 for the comprehensive investigation of current foreign economic problems and their coordination with domestic economic measures and the foreign policy goals of the United States. The CIEP's opponents in Congress did everything in their power to prove that the new council would duplicate the functions of existing agencies, such as the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policy and others. The Council on Economic Policy (CEP), established by R. Nixon in February 1973 under the chairmanship of Secretary of the Treasury G. Shultz "to guarantee better coordination in the formation and implementation of economic policy," created even more

confusion in the counseling and coordinating activities of the executive staff. The CEP was originally planned to play the same role in economics as the NSC was playing in foreign policy. But the CEP did not justify the hopes that were placed in it and only met three or four times as a super-departmental coordinating center.

Upon his assumption of the U.S. presidency after Nixon's resignation, G. Ford retained all of the advisory agencies in the economic sphere, including the CEP. The president himself headed the CEP, possibly to underscore his own personal interest in the resolution of economic problems. In this form, the CEP hung on for about a month, and in September 1974 there was something of a shakedown and the council's name was changed.¹³ Secretary of the Treasury W. Simon was appointed chairman of the council. Meetings of the full membership were held rarely, and all basic decisions were made at the daily sessions of his executive committee. According to Washington authorities, this partial reorganization of the CEP did not eliminate the duplication of operations in regard to foreign economic policy. The council also did not live up to expectations as the chief organ for the investigation of the comprehensive problems of economic regulation, since it was primarily concerned with matters of coordination.¹⁴

Under these conditions, the economic advisory agencies of the executive branch were still divided. After the establishment of the new CEP, the Council on Energy Resources, the White House advisory agency on all matters of energy policy, was formed in September 1974. In May 1975, a commission on foreign investments in the United States was founded by presidential order as the chief agency of the executive staff for the study of the effect of foreign investments in the American economy, the development of policy in this field and the submission of recommendations to the president through the CEP and NSC. In March 1976, Ford announced the establishment of a commission on agricultural policy to supervise the development of national policy on the use of food resources, which removed yet another large group of problems from the CEP's jurisdiction.

Therefore, by the time of J. Carter's arrival in the White House, there was a confusing network of parallel economic advisory and coordinating agencies, which had resulted from the serious economic problems that were increasingly becoming involved in the center of political struggle.

Announcing his intentions to reduce the White House staff and to make organizational improvements, Carter first set himself the goal of ridding himself of structural units duplicating the work of other agencies. Reports in the press state that the Council on Energy Resources is to be disbanded, but J. Schlesinger has been appointed the President's special counsel on energy affairs and plans have been made to establish a federal department to supervise these affairs. The CIEP has been virtually disbanded and its functions have mainly been relegated to the CEP, which has been renamed once again and is now known as the Group on Economic Policy. The members of this group are all of the members of the cabinet, but most of the work is done by the

executive committee, which is made up of the secretaries of state, the treasury, commerce and labor, a representative from the CEA, the director of the OMB and the President's advisers Z. Brzezinski (on national security),¹⁵ S. Eizenstat (on domestic affairs) and J. Watson (secretary of the cabinet).

During the determination of the President's domestic policy course, the conflicting interests of various social groups become quite apparent, and economic and political considerations become intricately interconnected with bourgeois political intrigues. Mass-scale unemployment and poverty, the position of the black population, the rise in the crime rate and other social problems in today's America have become chronic and are becoming even more acute. Even during the Johnson Administration, the establishment of a domestic political counterpart of the NSC was suggested; it was to disclose domestic crises before they had time to acquire uncontrollable dimensions.¹⁶ R. Nixon acted on this idea in March 1970 and the White House Domestic Council (DC) was established. In general, the DC's functions included "working out recommendations for the president on a broad range of matters of domestic policy" and "combining various aspects of domestic policy into a single entity." The council was also given certain more specific functions: the collection of information and the compilation of forecasts for the setting of national priorities, the coordination of national priorities for the purpose of the correct distribution of resources, control over the correspondence of programs to priorities and the preparation of proposals on reforms.¹⁷

The DC was conceived of as the most important agency for the development and implementation of domestic policy and, while it was not exactly stillborn, it was unable to carry out most of its assigned duties. Meetings of all the members were held quite rarely and matters of secondary importance were prevalent in the work of the DC and its committees.

G. Ford's attempt to make the DC play a more important role was also unsucessful, even though Vice-President N. Rockefeller was put in charge of the council and a policy and planning division was set up as part of its operational staff to draw up long-range plans covering the period up to the year 2000.

The DC was one of the first victims of Carter's organizational changes in the White House staff, not only because of its inefficiency, but also because the council had compromised itself during Nixon's presidency when his adviser, J. Ehrlichman, used the DC staff for improper machinations. At present, domestic problems are investigated for the President by a group headed by S. Eizenstat. He has jurisdiction over the former staff of the council, the size of which has again been reduced and the functions of which have essentially been reduced to the examination of day-to-day matters. The group is functionally divided into the following categories: domestic administration, energy and domestic resources, agriculture and rural development, urban problems, health, education and welfare, economics, civil rights, federal regulation and government reform.¹⁸

Eizenstat's group works in close contact with the cabinet secretariat and the OMB, participating in the examination of the proposed budgets of departments and submitting recommendations on bills prepared by the OMB staff.

State-monopolistic regulation of scientific and technical development and the increasing emphasis on the centralized administration, coordination and planning of scientific research and development are now characteristic features of today's America. The head of the executive branch plays an important role in the development and implementation of the government's scientific policy.

The first White House advisory agencies on scientific matters had obvious military aims. The Office of Scientific Research and Development (1940) was established and operated during World War II and the president's Science Advisory Committee (1952) was set up in the atmosphere of U.S. aggression in Korea.

The development of the president's scientific advisory staff was stimulated even more by the successful launching of the first Soviet artificial earth satellite, which evoked mass-scale criticism of the administration for the backwardness of American science and space technology. During 1957-1962, a multibranched system of presidential advisers on scientific and technical affairs took shape. The president's adviser on scientific affairs was at the center of this system and was the head of the White House Office of Science and Technology (OST). The system set up by the Kennedy Administration remained in existence until January 1973, when Nixon announced that the White House office would be disbanded and its functions would be turned over to the National Science Foundation, the director of which was appointed the president's scientific counsel.¹⁹

This reform, which was officially explained by the need for more efficient control on the federal level, gave rise to extensive debates in the scientific community and Congress which resulted in the passage of a bill on the organization and priorities of national scientific policy, which was signed by President Ford on 11 May 1976. This bill restored the White House scientific advisory and coordinating staff and elevated it to a higher level, including the Office of Scientific and Technical Policy (OSTP), the director of which was simultaneously the head of the Federal Coordinating Council on Science and Technology and the Intergovernmental²⁰ Scientific and Technical Advisory Group. The director of OSTP, appointed by the president "with the advice and consent" of the Senate, is a member of the DC and an adviser to the NSC during the discussion of scientific and technical matters. The same bill provided for the establishment of a temporary committee of advisers to the president for the purpose of working out recommendations on the basic areas of the government's scientific policy.

The bill of 11 May 1976 set the priorities in the areas of domestic and foreign policy and national security which will require scientific and technical efforts and proclaimed federal financing of scientific development a national policy. The passage of this bill after almost 3 years of debates

in congressional committees attests to the the significance attached by ruling circles in the United States to the development of scientific and technical potential for the resolution of economic and social problems within the nation and the reinforcement of the United States' international positions. The bill also represents an attempt to give the president a certain amount of control over Congress in matters concerning the development and implementation of the government's scientific policy.

The personal staff of the president has grown considerably during the years since the war and has become an important element of the government mechanism. While F. Roosevelt had to resort to appointing his personal assistants to fictitious positions in the departments of the executive branch, the staffs of recent presidents have included dozens of advisers, assistants and consultants, many of whom have had their own staff of personnel.

In view of the fact that it was precisely this category of White House advisers that was attacked during many administrations by the critics of strong presidential power and its resulting abuses of power, J. Carter promised that the authority of his staff would not exceed the authority of the cabinet members, that the size of his staff would be reduced to the minimum and that no presidential adviser would control the access of visitors and documents to the president. One of his concrete steps in this direction was the elimination of the post of chief of the White House staff (some of the men who occupied this position, namely S. Adams in the Eisenhower Administration and H. Haldeman in the Nixon Administration, became classic examples of human barriers to the Oval Office).

The first reports on work in the White House during the Carter Administration have indicated that the principles that were proclaimed (in counterbalance to the last administration) are not being implemented as smoothly as expected. The supposedly equal staff members began to fight over their degree of influence on the President. The main conflict arose between H. Jordan and J. Watson; these men had worked with Carter since the time when he was the governor of Georgia. The general consensus is that Jordan won this struggle, since he was put in charge of political affairs, while Watson has had to satisfy himself with the post of cabinet secretary.

The absence of a chief of staff has been compensated for by the establishment of a special administrative committee made up of nine of the President's senior advisers. One of them--Jordan--has been given control over the transmission of documents to the President. Before it reaches the Oval Office, each document is sent to the chief members of the staff and, when necessary, is supplemented by their comments.²¹

An important role in J. Carter's personal staff (just as in the staffs of his predecessors) is played by his press secretary and assistant for congressional liaison, as well as the men who draft the President's speeches.

J. Powell, the President's press secretary, advises the President on a broad range of topics and represents the President at White House briefings. He also has the responsibility of creating a good political image for the

President in the eyes of the public. The post of congressional liaison, which has existed since the Eisenhower Administration, was established to coordinate the actions of the two most important elements of the bourgeois government machine--the executive and legislative branches. F. Moore has been appointed the White House's main lobbyist in Congress for the Carter Administration. He has his own staff, consisting of three deputies and five assistants for special assignments. This group also coordinates the work of related subdivisions of the federal departments in the attempt to ensure that the executive branch take a united stand in the lobbies of the Capitol.

All of the President's public appearances, which frequently formulate government policy in a specific area, are backed up by a great deal of preparatory work by his staff of speech writers. In Nixon's time, the writers of the president's speeches were all concentrated in an editorial division which is still part of the White House structure. Compulsory attendance at important meetings with the President is required of the main employees appointed by Carter to this division--J. Fallows, G. Smith, H. Hertzberg, A. Nesmith and J. Doolittle.

The presidential advisory agencies described above are part of the executive staff and include specialists in civil service. In addition to this, the U.S. Government makes extensive use of external advisers, both by means of contracts with research centers and by means of the establishment of various types of advisory committees.²²

Due to the fact that the Federal Government is constantly forming new committees and disbanding others, the number of these committees varies, but it usually stays at approximately 1,300 with a total of around 24,000 consultants. Around 15 percent of all of these committees are "presidential commissions," which prepare recommendations on various matters for the President of the United States and his staff. These committees are mainly intended to serve as yet another means of merging the federal staff with the monopolies, representing a combined mechanism for the joint development of policy.

According to official documents of the American Government, representatives of large corporations were prevalent, for example, in such consultative agencies as the Commission on International Economic Affairs, the Advisory Committee on Industrial Policy in the Interests of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the President's Export Council, the Advisory Committee on International Currency Reform and others.²³ INDUSTRY WEEK cites the number of "envoys" from the largest monopolies to the federal advisory committees: 93 from the Radio Corporation of America, 92 from ITT, 79 from General Electric, 74 from AT & T, 70 from Exxon, 67 from Bendix, etc.²⁴

The advisory committees represent a kind of state-monopolistic symbiosis, in which the government has the opportunity to sound out the reactions of individual groups to federal initiatives, while the monopolies gain the possibility of privileged access to federal departments and legal lobbying.

After he became President, J. Carter ordered an investigation of the activities of the federal advisory committees and the liquidation of useless committees. It is possible that this investigation will reduce the total number of the committees, but there is no doubt that they will be preserved as an institution which is needed, in addition to all else, for the manipulation of the mass consciousness and the mobilization of public opinion in support of the President's political course.

During the first months of a new administration, when the president's actions are largely dictated by a pointedly negative attitude toward the work of his predecessor, it is difficult to predict the concrete forms the reorganization of the White House advisory staff will take. But J. Carter's first steps in this direction suggest several tendencies.

It would seem that the experience accumulated by past administrations in the organization of decision-making (both positive and negative) will be used by the new President. Even though certain structural units of the Executive Office of the President are to be liquidated, this is not likely to affect its basic elements--the NSC, CEA and OMB, the heads of which are the President's chief advisers. Certain work methods which proved effective in past administrations will also remain unchanged, as, for example, the compilation of reports on alternative decisions on a specific matter.

The reduction in the number of advisory and coordinating agencies in the executive office will not weaken presidential power, but will reinforce it and centralize it even more by reducing the number of persons involved in the preparatory work on important decisions.

The first steps in the organization of the work of the presidential staff permit us to assume that there will be serious obstacles to the implementation of the declared principles of "equal opportunity" for staff members and the pre-eminence of the cabinet. Since the first days after the inauguration, the chief members of J. Carter's personal staff have not opposed the cabinet, but they have had the opportunity to influence decisions on questions raised by the heads of departments.

The struggle for supremacy and influence is still going on within the President's personal staff. The presence of two categories of presidential assistants has already been officially recognized: The highest level is occupied by such figures as Jordan, Watson, Eizenstat, Lipshutz, Powell, Moore, Brzezinski and Schlesinger, while the lower level is occupied by special assistants on individual matters.

As for the cabinet, the example of the executive committee of the Group on Economic Policy suggests that the traditional inequality of individual department heads will be maintained, meaning that some of them will have much greater influence in the decision-making process than the rest of the cabinet. American researcher T. Cronin, in describing this phenomenon, conditionally divided the U.S. Cabinet into the "internal" (more influential) and "peripheral" groups, including not only the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the attorney general and the secretary of the

treasury in the first group, but also the president's chief advisers.²⁵ Experience has shown that this kind of system ensures that the same group of individuals, in different combinations, makes up the nucleus of all agencies advising the president. Recent events indicate that the new administration will not be an exception to this rule.

FOOTNOTES

1. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 25 December 1976, p 1799.
2. See, for example, THE WASHINGTON POST, 30 November 1976; NEW REPUBLIC, 11 December 1976, p 13.
3. S. Hess, "Organizing the Presidency," Wash., 1976, p 20.
4. "A Report on the Growth of the Executive Office of the President (House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service)," Wash., 1972, p 3.
5. For a description of the structure and functions of the OMB, see A. Deykin, "The President's Office of Management and Budget," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1973, pp 119-124.
6. In actuality, the Constitution does not mention this kind of board. Moreover, the very term "cabinet" is not used in the Constitution and was only coined by J. Madison (then a member of Congress) in 1793. The constitutional premise in regard to the President's right to demand the opinions (in written form) of heads of departments on matters within their sphere of competence has been interpreted so broadly through the years that experts on government have been able to compare and contrast the "constitutional" and "unconstitutional" advisory staffs of the President.
7. See, for example, "SShA: vneshnopoliticheskiy mekhanizm. Organizatsiya, funktsii, upravleniye" [The U.S. Foreign Policy Mechanism. Its Organization, Functions and Control], Moscow, 1972; Iv. Sevost'yan, "Planirovaniye vneshney politiki v SShA" [Foreign Policy Planning in the United States], Moscow, 1974; S. B. Chetverikov, "Kto i kak delayet politiku SShA" [U.S. Policy-Makers and Policy-Making Methods], Moscow, 1974, and others.
8. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 May 1971.
9. At present, the members of the NSC are the President, the vice-president, the secretary of state and the attorney general. At a meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23 November 1976, J. Carter discussed the possibility of making the secretary of the treasury a member of the NSC as well; on 17 January 1977, on the television program "Today," C. Schultze, appointed chairman of the CEA, announced that he and M. Blumenthal, secretary of the treasury, would "be party to NSC decisions."

10. THE WASHINGTON POST, 24 January 1977.
11. Ibid.
12. For a discussion of the history, role and structure of the CEA, see I. V. Likhacheva, "Ekonomicheskaya nauka i ekonomicheskaya politika" [Economics and Economic Policy], Moscow, 1975.
13. The English names of the councils--Nixon's Council on Economic Policy and Ford's Economic Policy Board--differ only in terms of the words used in the titles and not in terms of what the words mean. Past U.S. presidents also used this trick of renaming agencies for the purpose of giving them a new status or the appearance of something new or for the purpose of changing their leadership. For example, the CIEP had its own analog (with a slightly different name), which was established by D. Eisenhower and disbanded by J. Kennedy.
14. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 3 April 1976, pp 431-432.
15. Ibid., 12 February 1977, pp 234, 236.
16. P. Anderson, "The President's Men," N.Y., 1969, p 447.
17. Reorganization Plan, No 2, 1970 (House doc No 91-272), pp 3-4.
18. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 12 February 1977, p 236.
19. The National Science Foundation was founded in 1950 as an autonomous federal department with the objectives of increasing the nation's scientific potential, promoting international scientific cooperation and developing and introducing programs for the training of scientific personnel.
20. This refers to the state governments.
21. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 12 February 1977, p 235.
22. Although they have similar functions, the names of these agencies cover a wide terminological range. They may be called commissions, committees, councils, boards, operational groups, conferences, etc.
23. "The Role of Advisory Committees in U.S. Foreign Policy," Wash., 1975, pp 14, 16.
24. INDUSTRY WEEK, 23 February 1976, p 48.
25. "The Presidency Reappraised," N. Y., 1974, p 250.

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CABLE TV TODAY AND TOMORROW

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 46-54

[Article by Ye. V. Perfilova]

[Summary] Cable television, which is now being described as an innovation and as a revolution in the television industry, has actually been around for a quarter of a century. It has certain advantages over the ordinary type of television broadcasting. The quality of its reception is not affected by topographical peculiarities. It is capable of transmitting an unlimited quantity of signals and can therefore be broadcasted over many more channels than the other type. Its greatest advantage, however, is the opportunity it affords for two-way communications.

According to estimates, around 90 percent of all urban homes will be connected to television cable systems by 1990. This is quite an amazing statistic when we consider that this form of broadcasting was not originally intended for use in urban areas. The men who developed cable television did not dream of creating a revolution in the industry; they were merely trying to provide remote areas with better reception.

As a system of two-way communications, cable television can be used for the distribution of library books, videotelephone communications, the delivery of mail and the publication of electronic newspapers; it can also be a medium for mail-order trade, public opinion polls and referendums, outpatient medical services, caretaking services for homes and office buildings, public educational services, etc. In addition to providing consumers with services, the possibility for two-way communications will also aid politicians in acquiring precise data on the quantitative and qualitative makeup of their audience, in conducting television press conferences, in studying public opinion, etc. For this reason, some Americans are worried that cable television will become yet another form of intrusion into the individual's private life, a means of stricter control over the political views of the average citizen and an instrument of espionage.

During the initial stages of its development, cable television did not evoke any kind of objections from the owners of television stations and telephone companies. On the contrary, the communications industry was cable TV's greatest benefactor for some time. Naturally, there were good reasons for this: cable TV transmitted the programs of the major television networks into more homes, thereby making advertising time more valuable and contributing to the profits of the network bosses. The situation is quite different now. Cable TV has become a serious competitor of the local and national networks. This is quite evident from the fact that this form of broadcasting has now become quite prevalent in urban areas with excellent TV reception.

During the 25 years of its existence, cable television in the United States has been almost totally free of regulation by federal and state governments. On 27 June 1971, President R. Nixon appointed a special committee to investigate the possibilities of cable TV and to make the appropriate policy recommendations. The report of the Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications indicated that this form of broadcasting had the potential of becoming one of the most effective forms of mass communications. Naturally, its use or misuse will depend totally on its owning and controlling entities.

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BILL HAYWOOD: 'WHAT WE DREAMED OF...'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 55-66

[Article by M. I. Lapitskiy]

[Summary] Bill Haywood was born on 4 February 1869 in Salt Lake City. His father, a miner, died when Bill was 3 years old. The young boy had a short childhood. One semester at an elementary school in Salt Lake City constituted his formal education. At 9, he was already working in the mines and, at 15, he left his home and went to work in Nevada--also in the mines. From that time on, he did not stay long in one place until the end of his life.

At the end of the 19th century, one of the most radical labor unions was the Western Federation of Miners. Haywood joined this federation on its way up and made a great contribution to its radicalization. His first articles were published in the union monthly, MINERS MAGAZINE. His work as the treasurer of this union gave him a lifelong reputation as an honest man.

Haywood joined the Socialist Party soon after its founding in 1901. At this time, the progressive elements of the working class rejected opportunistic forms of struggle but sometimes succumbed to the influence of anarchists and syndicalists. Most of the members of the Socialist Party did not have enough experience in class struggle and therefore tended to reject any kind of political action. Haywood subscribed to these views for many years, not only serving the cause of anarchy and syndicalism, but also naively believing that the unions could gain control over enterprises by investing their funds in these companies.

At the end of 1904, Haywood became involved in one of the most important achievements of his life: He was one of the founders and leaders of the Industrial Workers of the World. The new organization was founded as a sign of protest against the opportunism and caste system of the American Federation of Labor. This was the most romantic era in the history of the American labor movement. The Wobblies (members of the IWW) were always on the move. Whenever they were fired from one job for their revolutionary activity, they immediately moved on to other places to continue this agitation. They

carried guns and were so filled with the spirit of militancy that they seemed to be the very personification of revolution.

At the end of 1905, a man named Harry Orchard murdered a former governor of Ohio and said that he had been hired as an assassin by certain labor leaders. Haywood was one of the leaders arrested. He was defended by Clarence Darrow, and Darrow's 11-hour speech in his defense and the ensuing wave of public protest led to Haywood's acquittal. Haywood was arrested again in 1917 for anti-war activities. He was sentenced to 20 years and spent some time in Leavenworth Prison, where he was beaten, chained, handcuffed to the door of his cell and forced to sleep on the concrete floor. This had a severe effect on his health. He developed diabetes and began to lose his sight.

In 1919, Haywood was released on bail, pending the investigation of his case by a higher court. This was when he joined the Communist Party of the United States. In the beginning of 1921, he gave up his hope of amnesty and left his native land for Soviet Russia. He lived the rest of his life, until 18 May 1928, in Soviet Russia, where he was always given the respect due a great hero and leader of the American labor movement.

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THE 'BIG SEVEN' IN LONDON

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, July 77
pp 67-71

[Article by A. N. Goncharov and S. A. Otreshko]

[Summary] On 7-8 May, leaders from the seven largest capitalist states--the United States, Japan, the FRG, England, France, Italy and Canada--met in London to discuss several of the most urgent problems of the capitalist economy and to determine ways of solving these problems together. This was the third summit meeting of this type; the leaders of the "Big Seven" had already met to discuss economic problems in Rambouillet in 1975 and in Puerto Rico in 1976.

The leaders of these nations are trying to convince the working public that the economic difficulties in the West are only of a temporary nature and that the necessary measures are being taken to correct this situation. In many countries, there is an obvious leftward shift in public opinion and the prospect of government by leftist parties and coalitions is becoming a distinct possibility. The agenda and final communique of this meeting did not mention a word about this, but many bourgeois newspapers frankly reported that the "Big Seven" had discussed ways of preventing communist participation in government.

The meeting in London was the first international summit meeting attended by the new American President. During his campaign, Carter criticized the Republicans for their insufficient flexibility in America's relations with its NATO partners and Japan and declared that these relations would occupy a position of primary significance in the foreign policy of the Democratic Administration. It soon became evident at the meeting, however, that not all of the Western leaders agree with Carter's interpretation of detente and his attempt to make it contingent upon the "struggle for human rights," which are supposedly being violated in the socialist countries. Carter's proposal to coordinate the discussion of economic problems with an analysis of the political situation was not enthusiastically supported by the other leaders attending the meeting. At the insistence of the French President, attention was concentrated on economic matters.

The agenda included the following topics: the present state of the capitalist economy and its prospects, methods for the stabilization of individual currencies and the development of international trade, the energy crisis and the relations between the developed capitalist countries and the developing states and some aspects of East-West relations.

Some of the Western European leaders expected Carter, who had so eloquently propagandized the ideal of "interdependence" in the Atlantic world, to offer these countries the assistance of the United States in their struggle to overcome their economic difficulties. They hoped that the American Government would stimulate economic growth in its own country more actively, thereby expanding the market for Western European imports. American big business, however, does not wish to put excessive pressure of this kind on the American economy, since it could lead to higher inflation, devalue the dollar even more and reduce the competitive potential of American exports. There is no room here for the "solidarity" preached by Carter.

During the discussion of relations with the developing states, the Western leaders tried to place some of the responsibility for these states on the socialist countries. This is patently ridiculous, since it is imperialism that is completely responsible for the pitiful position of the Third World. Relations with the developing states were also mentioned in another context at the meeting--in connection with the energy crisis in the West. The Western leaders determined that they would have to establish relations with the OPEC countries which would guarantee them continued imports of oil on reasonable terms.

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WASHINGTON-MANILA: NO DEAL

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 72-78

[Article by A. V. Shatilov]

[Summary] The status of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines has been the subject of talks between Manila and Washington for a long time. The first U.S. base was established here in 1904. At that time, it served as a small repair base for American ships. Gradually, the United States built a vast network of military facilities throughout the territory of its Asian colony. At first these bases were used by the United States in the interimperialist struggle, but after World War II they were primarily intended for use against the socialist countries. The American military doctrine of that time placed major emphasis on strategic aviation, but the limited effective radius of the aviation required that airports be moved as close as possible to the territory of the potential enemy. The United States tried to solve this problem by developing a network of air force bases overseas.

The first postwar American-Philippine agreement was concluded in 1947. It gave the United States the use of certain parts of Philippine territory rent-free for 99 years. Another agreement, a treaty on mutual defense, was signed in 1951. These and several others treaties and agreements involved the Philippines deeply in Washington's policy in Asia. Under pressure by Washington, the Philippines sent an infantry battalion of 1,500 soldiers to South Korea in 1950. During the Vietnam War, the Philippines sent a total of 2,300 of its men to South Vietnam.

The Filipinos have gained little from all of these agreements. Their economic development has been completely subordinated to the needs of the American military bases. This has led to excessive expansion of the service sphere. The bases have also fostered such social ills as drug abuse, crime and prostitution. The Filipinos do not even have the right to bring American servicemen to trial for crimes they have committed. The U.S. military presence in the Philippines is having a negative effect on Philippine foreign policy. Many of the developing countries regard Manila

as the "Trojan horse" of American imperialism, which impedes the country's participation in the movement for nonalignment.

The demands put forth by the Filipinos have been simple. They wish the bases to be known as "Philippine bases temporarily being used by the United States." They feel that only the flag of the Philippines should be raised over these bases. They have requested that the United States consult them whenever it plans to use the bases against other states. They have also asked that rent be paid for the use of the bases, and in monetary form rather than in the form of obsolete weapons. Several other demands were made which concerned the Filipino employees on the American bases. These included the right of collective bargaining and the opportunity to set up grievance committees in cases of labor disputes. They have also called for an end to one shameful practice: The American authorities force the Filipino employees to sign a document which gives the Americans the right to search their homes. This is an insulting and offensive practice and the Filipinos will not tolerate it any longer.

Therefore, the Filipinos are not trying to break their military and political alliance with the United States and are not demanding that the Americans give up their bases. They are simply attempting to make this alliance less humiliating and degrading for the Philippines.

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PANAMA-AMERICAN TALKS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 79-83

[Article by P. G. Litavrin]

[Summary] The Carter Administration has announced its intention to settle the most acute problem of Washington's Latin American policy--the problem of the Panama Canal. Washington officials now realize that it would be futile to continue their procrastinating tactics in the talks between Panama and the United States. These talks have been going on now for 13 years and the president of Panama has announced that 1977 will be the last year of the talks. But this is not the only reason for the Americans' willingness to settle the problem. The uncertain status of the Panama Canal is having an extremely negative effect on the general state of American relations with Latin America.

The American press has reported that the Carter Administration regards the negotiations on the canal as an opportunity to convince Latin America of the fact that a new era has begun in Pan-American relations. In 1974, U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger, signed a document which officially recognized the injustice of the Panama Treaty of 1903 and stated the need for a new agreement. Among other stipulations, this document envisaged participation by Panama in the administration and defense of the canal; the country was also to receive a proportional amount of the profits gained from its use. The secretary of state was forced to sign this document by the continuous growth of patriotic feeling in Panama. This was also the reason for Washington's agreement to begin negotiations on the status of the canal in 1964. At that time, mass demonstrations in Panama made it clear to the Americans that it would be quite dangerous to ignore the legitimate demands of the Panamanians.

The February and May rounds of talks, however, essentially produced no results. They simply indicated that the present administration in Washington is following in the footsteps of previous administrations by setting terms which are incompatible with the sovereignty and national independence of Panama. Disputes arose over the length of time during which the agreement was to be in effect and over the number of bases the Americans would

maintain on Panamanian territory during the course of this period. It was quite obvious that Washington did not intend to relinquish control over the Canal Zone.

The United States' reluctance to turn the canal over to the Panamanians stems from economic and military considerations. Canal revenues are estimated at 150 million dollars a year, of which Panama only receives 2.3 million. The convenience of this "short-cut" improves the American balance of foreign trade to the tune of 1.5 billion dollars annually. In addition to this, if there were no Panama Canal, the American commercial fleet would use 71 percent more fuel, which would have a catastrophic effect on prices. The military significance of the canal can be judged from the following facts: At present, the American Armed Forces occupy 85.4 percent of the Canal Zone and only 4.4 percent of the zone is used for the operations involved in guiding ships through the canal. There are 14 American military bases here within an area of only 1,432 square kilometers.

Although the economic and political value of the canal to the Americans is indisputable, the zone is quite an impediment from the political standpoint. This important stronghold of American imperialism in Latin America is constantly creating problems for Washington. In the eyes of the Latin Americans, the Canal Zone is an "enclave of colonialism." The Americans themselves are beginning to regard the zone as a delayed-action bomb capable of going off at any moment.

The future of Pan-American relations depends greatly on the outcome of the Panama Canal talks. A great deal is said in Washington about the need for basing foreign policy on moral principles, but the general consensus of opinion in Latin America is that it is precisely these principles which are lacking in the American attitude toward the Canal Zone. This is evident from the United States' desire to retain exclusive rights and privileges on the territory of a sovereign country and its unceasing intervention in the domestic affairs of this country.

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CHANGES IN STRUCTURE OF UNSKILLED LABOR

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 84-94

[Article by I. V. Bushmarin]

[Summary] Scientific progress and several other objective processes and factors are constantly increasing the number of workers engaged primarily in mental labor. In the United States, these already make up almost half of the total labor force. Although it would seem that this would reduce the number of workers engaged primarily in physical labor, this number is also increasing gradually. The widespread use of technical equipment in all spheres of economic activity requires millions of workers for the repair and maintenance of this equipment. The constant tendency toward enlargement in the service sphere, which is even becoming excessive in the bourgeois society, also contributes toward the increase in the number of unskilled personnel.

Unskilled workers are those who perform simple, routine operations in various branches of the economy. Their work does not require any preliminary vocational training or special education. The work is explained to them on the job and the skill of performing the particular operations is acquired within a few days. In some cases, the work requires a great deal of physical effort.

The unskilled labor force has certain demographic characteristics which distinguish it from the total working population. For example, simple physical labor must be regarded as primarily a sphere of male labor. In 1975, women made up 8.6 percent of the unskilled labor force in the United States, while they accounted for 39.6 percent in the total labor force. The average age of unskilled workers is lower than the national average--34.1 as against 39.2. Within the unskilled labor force itself, 35 percent of the men and 25 percent of the women are under the age of 25.

According to the 1970 census, only 53 percent of the unskilled male laborers and 48 percent of the women worked year-round. This indicates the seasonal nature of the demand for this kind of work. Unskilled female workers are less likely to work year-round than the men. In most cases, women receive lower wages than the men performing the same jobs.

The professional instability and high turnover of unskilled workers usually deprive them of the protection of trade unions and of the chance to participate actively in the economic and political struggle of the working class. When there is a decline in production, the unskilled workers are the first to be laid off and the last to find new jobs. With the exception of the very young, most unskilled workers remain on the lowest rung of the professional ladder all their lives.

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BOOK REVIEWS

ECOLOGICAL WARFARE IN INDOCHINA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul. 77 pp 95-97

[Review by V. V. Glazov of the book "Ecological Consequences of the Second Indochina War," Stockholm, SIPRI, 1976, X + 119 pages]

[Text] In the foreword to this book published under the aegis of SIPRI -- the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute -- the director of the institute, F. Barnaby, explains that the book, in effect, is a monograph written by the American professor of botany Arthur H. Westing. The extensive factual material brought together in this volume serves as incontrovertible evidence of some actions by the U.S., unprecedented in their hostility, directed against the people and the very environment of Indochina. It proves that the territory of Indochina had been converted into an enormous polygon where new methods of warfare were being developed and tried out in actual combat situations.

The book convincingly demonstrates both its own timeliness and the enormous importance of the agreement reached on 18 May of this year banning the use of any artificial means for affecting the natural environment as a method for waging war.

Quoting statements by American generals, Westing writes that the destruction of forests and bushy areas was being carried out for the purpose of limiting the enemy's freedom of movement as well as to deprive him of areas suitable for troop concentration and general concealment. Harvests were being destroyed in order to deprive the civilian population of food and other resources, as well as to oblige it to migrate to areas controlled by U.S. troops. Communications were destroyed in order to cut off enemy army units and partisan formations from their supply bases.

As an eyewitness to these events, Westing is forced to admit that the U.S. aggression in Indochina was a premeditated act to damage the natural environment.

From the information cited in this book it is possible to define one of the characteristics of the imperialist aggression in Indochina, in these terms:

It was the first war in history in the course of which, besides elimination of enemy forces, the natural environment itself was seriously damaged for military purposes. Premeditated steps affecting the environment were designed to inflict the greatest possible damage upon enemy troops, make it more difficult for them to conduct military operations, destroy the morale of Vietnamese soldiers, partisans, and the peaceful population -- and break their will to resist the aggressors. This form of strategic action later came to be known in the foreign press as "geophysical" or "ecological" war.

The director of the metereological department of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Nguyen Xyen, has compared geophysical warfare -- because of its lasting effects -- to the results of a nuclear attack.

Specific data cited in the monograph make it possible to describe some of the methods for conducting geophysical war which had been developed and extensively used by the American command.

One of these methods is described as being a deliberate destruction of the vegetal cover, the surface layer of the soil, the crops, and roads, by means of systematic mass bombardment, unlimited use of chemicals and a large-scale utilization of special technology, as well as the use of incendiary products for setting off fires, etc. (Chapter 5)

Aviation, as well as both land and naval artillery, served primarily for attacking extensive agricultural areas -- entire sectors at a time. With this end in view, more than 14 million tons of high-powered explosives were used between 1965 and 1973, with one-third of this total being used between 1968 and 1969. As a result, more than 250 million blast holes were created in the ground, and the amount of soil ejected from these holes amounted to about three billion cubic meters. Depending on the composition of the soil in each case, these holes, when later filled with water, turned arable land into swamps, while in other cases the ground hardened as a result and the soil became unfit for cultivation.

The author reports that since 1967, American troops started using special large-caliber bombs weighing 6,800 kilograms each. These devices would explode above the surface of the earth and were used primarily for destroying plant life in the dense jungles so as to clear the terrain for setting up helicopter landing platforms. Other new-type bombs of various sizes were also used. Their impact was designed to be primarily horizontal rather than vertical. They were used to clear up specific areas, blow up any existing mine fields, and strike down any form of life unprotected by shelters.

A separate chapter in the monograph is devoted to the use of chemical substances. During the war years, writes Westing, with the use of planes, helicopters and motor boats, there was squirted over Indochina a total of over 72 million liters of various chemical compounds. Of these, about 62 million liters were used for deforestation and destruction of other forms of plant life, while the remainder was aimed specifically at the rice fields. Westing describes in detail the composition of these various chemicals, the methods for their utilization, and the effects of their use on plant

and animal life -- including bees and even bacteria. But in this chapter, as, incidentally, also in the rest of the book, Westing refrains from any assessments which would describe the results of this destructive war against nature upon the health and living conditions of the population. And yet in articles by Western authors it was often noted that the use of poisonous chemicals in Indochina -- and especially in South Vietnam -- frequently resulted in poisoning the entire population -- often with fatal results. In places where the rice fields and water sources had been contaminated, there were cases of children born with congenital defects.

Compared to the use of bombs or chemical means, the most effective method, according to Westing, proved to be the mechanical clearing of entire areas by means of heavy tractors equipped with special cutters -- the so-called "Roman plows." *) This method was first used in Vietnam by the American command in 1966. It was first tried out in clearing operations on both sides of principal highways, creating clear stretches 100 to 300 meters in width. Next, entire factory areas under partisan control were destroyed. In all, the "Roman plows" cleared some 325,000 hectares of land in South Vietnam, or 2 percent of the country's total area. Similar operations were also carried out in areas of Cambodia bordering on South Vietnam. (p 47)

Along with these plows, other methods were also being experimented with. Thus, rubber plantations and areas covered with young trees were cut down by "drags" -- three- to five-ton chains, from 45 to 75 meters long and attached to a tractor at either end, as well as by other giant installations known as "forest crushers."

Bombings, chemical compounds and engineering technology used in South Vietnam totally destroyed an area of 586,000 hectares and partly destroyed 5.6 million hectares more. (p 70) In addition, many thousands of hectares of arable land also suffered damage, since the use of the above methods creates soil erosion and decay, rendering the given area unfit for cultivation.

The author examines several major operations which were designed to set off vast fires over large areas. For this purpose, the forests were first treated with herbicides so as to promote the spreading of the flames. Attempts to set off forest fires, despite unfavorable climatic conditions (high humidity and precipitation levels), were continued throughout the war.

What can be regarded as a second method for waging geophysical war includes such things as ways to induce, artificially, spontaneous natural disasters. In Indochina, such operations were carried out with the help of intense, artificially stimulated pouring rains, designed to concentrate on specific areas, as well as to produce floods, so as to oblige the enemy to divert a part of his forces to combat the effects of the latter.

During the period from 1966 to 1972, a total of 2,658 such overflights was carried out over Indochina, and a total of 47,967 cloud-seeding cartridges were dropped containing crystals of silver iodide and lead iodide, producing sudden and voluminous precipitation. The author notes that cloud-seeding was also carried out over the territory of North Vietnam. Special reagents were

* The name is derived from the American city in Georgia where these items are manufactured.

also used (the author does not identify them), which produce the sort of precipitation capable of interfering with antiaircraft defense units of the enemy and hampering the operations of his aviation.

In the part of the book dealing with floods, the author indicates that the U.S. military command held such floods in very high regard even back in the days of the Korean war, and it considered the destruction of dams as one of the principal tasks of its air operations. In 1972, on the eve of the rainy season, American aviation subjected to bombardment and artillery fire the dams and dikes of almost all the principal rivers in the DRV. It was only thanks to the decisive protests of world public opinion that such bombings were eventually discontinued -- thereby possibly undermining the Pentagon's plans for creating a disastrous flood in the land. As for the causes of the flood which did hit Vietnam in 1971, the author says that, so far, they have not been determined but he does not exclude the possibility that it was the result of premeditated massive downpours. (p 56) "Artificial alteration of the weather as a method of warfare," warned the American scientist, Harvard biology professor Matthew S. Meselson, "involves the inherent danger of resulting in serious and possibly uncontrollable and unpredictable destruction. Moreover, such destruction can conceivably have even more severe consequences for the peaceful population than for the warring armies."*

The Geneva convention opens new possibilities in the field of disarmament. With the growth of man's capacity to control the processes of nature, it is easy to see how destructive would be the results of the use of such operations for military purposes. The convention bans all forms of military or any other form of unfriendly utilization of ways to influence the natural environment. Thus a new step has been taken to strengthen peace and preserve man's natural environment.

As for the monograph itself, it deserves to be placed on the bookshelf alongside other books describing the operations of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

*SCIENCE, 16 June 1972, p 1219.

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IN QUEST OF RATIONAL PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77 pp 97-99

[Review by A. A. Voronkov of the book "Analysis for Public Decisions" by Edward S. Quade, New York, American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, X + 324 pages.]

[Text] The name of the leading American specialist in systems analysis, Edward Quade, is well known to all who are interested in the problems of the preparation and making of decisions by U.S. government departments. Books by the same author, published in the 1960's and the early 1970's, included "Systems Analysis and Policy Planning. Applications in Defense," "Limitations of the 'Cost-Effectiveness' Analysis," "Approach to Decision-Making in the Military Sphere," "Analysis for Military Decisions," etc. As can be readily seen by their titles, these books dealt with purely military theatics -- essentially, with problems involving the improvement of planning and management in the creation of new types of weapons. At the same time, it is precisely studies such as these that are the foundation of systems analysis, that powerful instrument used for justifying managerial decisions.

Let us note that the choice of such theatics is no accident. Quade's scientific activity over many years was connected with the noted "non-profit" Rand Corporation, which the progressive American publicist Paul Dickson describes as "unquestionably the most powerful research organization connected with military circles in the U.S."* Having worked for Rand for a quarter of a century as a mathematician and having eventually become chief of its mathematics division, Quade retired in 1973 and then, for some time, worked as a consultant for a number of government organizations. Since February 1976 he has been a member of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis -- the first scientific center in history combining scientists from 15 different countries -- including socialist ones.**

Quade's new book being reviewed below, represents a generalization of the concepts of systems analysis, accumulated by the author and his colleagues at the Rahd Corp. But this time, it is devoted not to military problems but to the analytical methodology being used in the civilian government departments of the U.S. It could be best described, perhaps, as a "textbook" of sorts

*Paul Dickson, "Think Tanks," translated from English, Moscow, 1976, p 64.

** The institute was created in 1972 on the initiative of the USSR and the USA in the city of Laxenburg, Austria.

for officials involved in the formulation and execution of "policy decisions." A significant part of the book is devoted to the traditional stages and elements of systems analysis. At the same time, Quade raises in his book a number of questions which had not been analyzed before to the same extent. Unlike most guidance books intended for the leaders, this one does not examine in detail the decision theory, linear programming, the theory of probability, statistics, and other disciplines the mastery of which is nevertheless an indispensable precondition for understanding Quade's book. This has enabled the author to concentrate his attention on his principal subject -- the use of analytical methods at the governmental level.

As is known, many systems, procedures and methods of government management have originally been developed in the U.S. for use in the Department of Defense (systems analysis, programmed budgeting, etc.), and only later were these techniques transferred to the civilian spheres of government activity as well. Internal problems of modern American society have forced Rand to use more than a third of its resources for the solution of such civilian problems. An even greater amount of attention is being devoted to questions of the rationalization of the process of government decision-making. "The need for this is acute," admits Quade. "We see everywhere evidence of inefficient programming, wasted funds, and unresolved problems." (p VII).

In discussing the factors which brought about the "unsatisfactory condition of government management," the author notes its low present quality and analyzes the causes for this state of affairs. (pp 3 - 4) He attributes this situation primarily to the spread of bureaucracy, poor communications, imperfect liaison and accounting facilities, and low qualifications of the analytical personnel. Moreover, notes the author, the methods for resolving the problems with which the government has to cope and which have been getting more and more complicated, have not undergone any serious change in many years. Finally, government programs do not have a built-in mechanism to signal violations in the carrying out of the decisions adopted. Here, the factors of profit and competition do not apply, as they do in the private sector.

The key term in the book is "policy analysis." It is defined by the author, in a broad sense, as "any form of analytical investigation which generates and presents information in such a way as to improve the basis for the judgment of leaders responsible for the development of policy." (p 4) But how, in this case, is this concept to be correlated with the more traditional forms of analytical research (study of operations, systems analysis, etc.)? To systematize his views, Quade constructs a three-step terminological system on the following basis: Type of problem -- Form of analysis -- Methods of analysis. Thus, at the first level, he identifies five basic types of problems in the solution of which "policy analysis" can be helpful: effectiveness of the operation, distribution of resources, evaluation of the carrying out of the program, planning and budgeting, and "strategic selection." (p 14)

The author believes that one of the causes for the collapse of the system of "planning, programming and budgeting" (PPB) -- so extensively publicized during the second half of the 1960's -- was the low quality of the analytical research.*

* In saying this, Quade fails to mention an important factor which contributed to the rejection of PPB at the federal level: the clash of this insufficiently formalized system of decision making with the conflicting interests of state-monopoly capitalism in the U.S. and its bureaucratic government mechanism.

Analytical forms such as operations research, systems analysis, and "policy analysis" are designed to help government officials in justifying their decisions. Describing these methods, the author notes that the study of operations is designed primarily to determine the optimal strategy for action. Systems analysis adds the possibility of taking into account economic factors as well as a study of the objectives and their relationship to the means for achieving them; while "policy analysis," using the results of both of the other forms, makes it possible to examine the distributive, organizational and political aspects of the chosen course of action. (p 22) Finally, within the framework of these three forms of analysis, a number of other forms of analysis can also be used, such as imitation, games, mathematical modeling, and many others.

One of the unquestioned merits of the book under review is its formulation of an adequately stable classification system. It includes practically all methods and procedures of analytical research which during the past decade have literally flooded the various monographs and periodicals devoted to questions of government management.

In a separate chapter, the author examines the procedural-organizational aspects of carrying out an investigation. Here he describes the first stage of the analytical process as being the "identification of the problem," and he explains the drafting of special documents to help structure and understand a given problem situation. (p 80)

The author describes in detail such generally used concepts in analytical research as limit expenditures, discounting standards, the principle of the "cost of possibilities" and some others. He also cites in this connection an example of computing "social expenditures" as reflected in the pollution of the American environment through the excessive use of automobiles.

It is interesting that Quade, while expressing high esteem for the role which quantitative methods play in the process of government decision-making, nevertheless recognizes their limitations. "There is no doubt," he writes, "that no matter what problem in the field of government policy is studied by the analyzer, there will always be cases in which quantitative methods will be either inapplicable or inadequate." (p 181) In this same connection, the book also examines questions of the significance of intuition and judgment, the use and organization of the work of experts, and the creation of "scenarios."

Of significant interest are the parts of the book containing a description of the methods of processing indeterminate factors as well as that rapidly growing instrument of government management known as "program evaluation."

Even when analytical research is conducted in a way to meet all the requirements and at a high scientific level, the decision-making leader faces yet another complex problem related to the carrying out of the results and recommendations obtained. This is the subject of the concluding chapter of the book. As Quade emphasizes, "the political environment affects more or less the nature of the problems being analyzed -- who does what, and how -- as well as what decisions are taken as a result, and how they are carried out. (p 269)

Taking fully into account the influence of the political environment or, more accurately, the "attuning" of these analytical consequences to the interests of this environment -- which have a distinct class character -- such is the basic essence of the advice which analytical specialists and leaders involved in decision-making in the "big government" of the U.S. can draw from this book. Like many American authors, Quade, in soberly assessing the "political realities" of modern capitalist society, which impose objective limits upon the process of "introducing rationality" into the government's management methods, also ignores, at the same time, the root causes which generate these contradictions.

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CSO: 1803

SOCIAL DEMAGOGY IN THE SERVICE OF IBM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 100-102

[Review by G. B. Kochetkov of the book "The Sun Never Sets on IBM" by N. Foy,
New York, William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1975, XVIII plus 218 pages]

[Text] The American International Business Machines Corporation has interested researchers in different fields of the science of management for a long time. There is every reason for this: This is one of the largest and most profitable monopolies in the world. For several decades its profits have been so stable that IBM stock quotations are the highest in the stock market. The company's products dominate the computer industry. Products developed in its laboratories become the world standard. It is able to quite "painlessly" solve problems arising in the national markets of the more than 130 nations in which the company conducts its business operations.

What has made this kind of success possible? What methods is IBM using to control its multinational army of 250,000 blue- and white-collar workers in all parts of the world? Nancy Foy, prominent specialist in the field of electronic data processing and international management consultant, attempts to answer these questions in her book, "The Sun Never Sets on IBM."

The author does not go beyond a simple description of company administrative methods, only one aspect of which interests N. Foy--she sees them as a means for the acquisition of stable high profits. The author is not interested in the sociopolitical aspect of company operations.

Nonetheless, the facts presented in the book present a clear picture of the degree to which the labor and mental abilities of blue- and white-collar workers are exploited in the offices and enterprises of IBM.

Everyone knows about H. Ford's system, which made the worker an appendage of the machine and a faceless cog in the wheel of automatic production, but few people know about the system of T. Watson, the founder of IBM, who perfected an intricate system for the moral and psychological brainwashing of

workers and their inculcation with a common "complex of corporate faith" in the power of the company and the infallibility of its administrators.

For this purpose, IBM employs carefully planned procedures of personnel hiring, training and advancement. For example, the company only hires individuals with no previous work experience, that is, individuals who have not been psychologically brainwashed by other companies and have no possibility of comparing them with IBM. All new employees undergo a training program which is twice as long and twice as intensive as the programs of all other companies (p 3). The purpose of the program does not consist as much in the cultivation of specific technical skills as in the inculcation of a "complex of corporate faith" in the new employee. Later on, throughout the employee's entire business career, he is retrained several times.

But the heads of IBM know that "faith" alone is not enough for the attainment of their goal--the creation of an atmosphere of "class harmony and cooperation." For this reason, from the time of the company's founding, Watson and his followers emphasized informal methods of management to satisfy the ambitions of employees. With the aid of these methods, all company workers are instilled with a feeling of membership in "the united and great IBM family." The most varied means are used to achieve this end; for example, so-called "family evenings" are organized. "People who can play well together will work well together," T. Watson loved to say (p 9). As a result of the mass psychological brainwashing of employees (which, incidentally, frequently includes direct interference in the personal lives of employees and other intolerable practices), the company develops a conformist type of worker, "who loves his wife, children, dog, friends, lawn and the flower-beds around his cottage." He works hard and well, takes an interest in his neighbors, respects education and has moderate liberal views. He likes to travel and appreciates art and music (p 4). But this portrait does not leave room for politics. This is the prerogative for administrators at the top. Moreover, IBM is above the inter-party struggle. For example, one of its vice presidents occupied an important post in the Republican Administration, while another became one of President Carter's advisers on scientific matters.

The fostering of a passion for travel and a change of scene plays an important role in the corporate ideology of IBM. The fact is that an employee is usually rewarded for good work with a "horizontal" transfer rather than with a promotion. According to an IBM tradition, "a new job which is different from the old job is a better job" (p 8). This attitude is fostered during the process of personnel training and retraining.

The policy of horizontal transfers, or rotation, has several purposes. Above all, an individual who has worked in several jobs or even in several countries has a greater feeling of involvement in the affairs of the firm and membership in the "IBM family." In addition to this, the rapid and painless transfer of employees is used as the most effective means of transmitting technology and new developments to branches within the United States

and abroad. "The best way of spreading new technology is to transfer the people who understand it" (p 8). This is the principle guiding the company. It is not a new idea, but no other firm in the world has used it as productively as IBM.

In her book, N. Foy shows that IBM was one of the first companies to conduct a flexible multinational policy: The company was the first to appoint foreigners to administrative positions in its international branches and, at present, only 300 of the more than 115,000 overseas employees of IBM are Americans (p 6).

The well-organized "rotation of ideas" plays a special part in the development of the corporate image and "family" feelings. The many periodicals published for internal use serve as the main channel for this. For example, each employee receives a magazine called THINK!; in the United States, 14 different editions of IBM NEWS and more than 20 local bulletins are circulated. The network of overseas publications is just as extensive: special bulletins are published in seven languages for the 450 top-level administrators alone, and the total number of periodicals exceeds 30. All of these propagandistic media are intended for the brainwashing of personnel. The published materials focus the attention of their readers on the internal problems of the company, diverting them from active participation in the national liberation and workers' movements in their own nations.

In recent years, the heads of the company have been increasingly concerned about "feedback," that is, information on the workers' feelings about their administrators and the company in general. Various types of public opinion polls serve as the source of this kind of information in IBM. For example, a program called "Speak Out!" has been established in many foreign branches. With the aid of this program, administrators hope to "sound out" the opinions of branch employees (p 128). According to the heads of IBM themselves, these programs have not lived up to expectations. The book does not give the reasons for this, but they are obvious, since the main thing is not to simply disclose problems, but to take measures to solve them. And it is precisely this that cannot be done within the framework of a capitalist enterprise. The polls show that dissatisfaction is growing even among the IBM employees in a privileged position.

Against the author's will, the antiworker aims of all company policies are made quite apparent in the book. The most conclusive proof of this is the fact that there are no labor union organizations at any of the IBM enterprises. This is allegedly due to the creation of privileged conditions for most of the company employees. The enormous monopolistic profits of IBM make it possible for the company to pay all categories of employees salaries that are an average of 7 percent higher than the salaries at other enterprises of this type in the United States and Western Europe (p 114). The company has a psychologically well-planned system for the outright bribery of employees by means of bonuses which can amount to 5,000 dollars. The

heads of the company rarely use a raise in salary to reward good work. They feel that this produces only a short-term effect directly at the time when the raise is granted and costs the firm too much. Small sops, on the other hand, can "sweeten the life of a valuable employee at the necessary moment." According to the estimates of IBM experts, this system is five times as effective. Another method of employee bribery consists in the sale of company stocks on preferential terms (at 85 percent of the market price), which is a method that has been practiced since the days of T. Watson (p 114).

The author is obviously delighted with IBM's success and describes the company system of moral and material "stimuli" for the workers as a model to be emulated. N. Foy could not, however, completely avoid the mention of the conflict between labor and capital that has been growing at IBM in recent years, despite its carefully planned system of social cosmetics. The "IBM family," which has been so painstakingly developed over more than 60 years, is beginning to fall apart: More and more foreign employees are becoming dissatisfied, the "family" traditions are being broken and more and more specialists are leaving IBM. Each year, more than 2,000 employees leave the company (p 148). They take experience, knowledge and "know-how" with them. In addition to all of this, the corporation's rivals have been giving it more and more competition in recent years.

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THE NUCLEAR PARADOX AND ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE IT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77 pp 102-103

[Review by V. F. Davydov of the book "Nuclear Paradox" by Michael A. Guhin, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976, 77 pages.]

[Text] The book under review deals with one of the most urgent problems in modern international relations -- the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The author analyzes the American policy on this subject and seeks to identify the measures that could reduce the danger of the misuse, for military purposes, of atoms intended for peace.

Concentrating on the essence of the nuclear paradox in the modern world, Guhin writes that the intensive development of nuclear energetics has led to an inevitable dilemma: "how to prevent the danger of proliferation of the development of nuclear weapons while, at the same time, continuing to move forward to derive the advantages from the atom, bearing in mind that in both cases the technology is identical." (p 1)

In the author's opinion, the acquisition of atomic weapons by a number of countries does not, in itself, constitute a direct threat to the security of the leading nuclear powers, but it can nevertheless have a destabilizing effect upon international relations -- especially in the world's crisis areas such as the Middle East.

Examining American policy in this area from the point of view of historical retrospective, the author comes to the conclusion that U.S. policy was not always consistent or logical. Thus, the "Baruch plan" of 1946 regarding international control was "doomed to failure" according to the author, because it proved unacceptable to other countries -- the USSR, among others. The author believes that this was entirely natural because the Baruch plan called for the retention by the U.S. of certain unilateral advantages in the use of atomic energy for military purposes. Moreover, at that time, Washington did not want to "connect the problem of control over the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes with the problem of nuclear disarmament." (p 9) The adoption of the "Atoms for Peace" program in 1953 merely anticipated

the spread of knowledge and technology in the sphere of utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Only the conclusion of the treaty on nonproliferation in 1968 became, in the author's opinion, a "significant landmark" in this area of foreign policy operations of the U.S. (p 13)

While taking a favorable view of the nonproliferation treaty and recommending that the U.S. should continue to support it, Guhin warns at the same time that this treaty did not -- and does not -- pretend to give an all-embracing answer to various questions relating to this problem. In this connection the author emphasizes that it can hardly be expected, in the foreseeable future, that all countries in the world, without exception, would subscribe to the treaty. (As of now, some 50 countries have still failed to do so.)

Guhin insistently recommends that the principal countries exporting nuclear technology and fissionable material should, in addition to their obligations under the nonproliferation treaty, also undertake coordinated steps in the field of trade, as well as adopt a complex system of control over the use of nuclear wastes from atomic power stations in the importing countries. At the same time, the author emphasizes that a good many difficulties would face the coordination of such a policy, not the least of which would be the competitive struggle of the U.S., the countries of Western Europe, and Japan to acquire highly profitable markets for the sale of their nuclear technology. Security considerations in the sale of nuclear reactors and the need for effective control over such trade are often set aside in the face of a yearning for the fabulous profits to be derived at the competitors' expense.

In Guhin's opinion, even coordination among countries able to export nuclear technology, the development of effective means for control, and even any future expansion of the nonproliferation treaty may possibly not prevent completely the process of nuclear weapons proliferation in the world. However, this in no way proves the senselessness or uselessness of efforts to restrain such proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Summarizing his research on the subject, the author writes that the problem of nonproliferation cannot be resolved merely by technical means, such as the strengthening of control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On a broader plane, the solution of this problem is possible only with the creation of an international climate which would favor restraint by the nuclear powers on this question. It will still be necessary, of course, also to achieve more concrete results in the field of limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, he writes, as well as alter the military strategy of the nuclear powers, set up real nuclear-free zones, etc.

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CSO: 1803

THE MARINE CORPS: RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRACTICE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul. 77 pp 103-105

[Review by B. D. Yashin of the book "Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here?" by Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1976, 93 pages]

[Text] The history of the United States Marine Corps and its utilization in protecting the "special" interests of the U.S. abounds in cases of major landings and expeditionary operations -- including diversionary and punitive "missions" on foreign territory.

The monograph under review by members of The Brookings Institution, Binkin and Record, entitled "Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here?" is interesting in that it testifies to the attempts by U.S. military theoreticians to review critically the role and mission of the Marine Corps under modern conditions.

In the opinion of the authors, the U.S. Marine Corps, entering the third century of its existence, can no longer count upon retaining the exclusive priority status which it always enjoyed.

Binkin and Record believe that this is due to the fact that at the present time, as well as in the foreseeable future, the success of any traditional Marine Corps operation as an advance unit in carrying out an amphibious landing would seem dubious.

The authors come to the conclusion that under modern conditions the function of the Marine Corps becomes very vague, in general.

The monograph notes that the Marine Corps, being essentially a form of "light" infantry, would hardly be able to meet the present-day requirements for preparing and conducting combat operations while facing the well-equipped forces of the potential adversary -- both while approaching the enemy's shore and after landing there. The authors also regard as dubious

any efficient use of Marine Corps aviation, which is virtually a third component of the U.S. air forces, and now accounts for more than 50 percent of the total appropriations for the Marine Corps.

Discussing the evolution of the basic amphibian function of the Marine Corps, which is to capture a foothold on the enemy shore and hold it to ensure the success of a subsequent landing by the principal forces in large landing operations, the authors come to the conclusion that this function of the Marine Corps is in conflict with modern reality.

The monograph notes that the purpose and condition of the Marine Corps, as well as its operational structure at the beginning of 1976 (three divisions of marines, three air detachments and some naval units) dates from the National Security Act of 1947, which stated that the Marine Corps was intended both to take part in joint operations with other types of armed forces as well as carry out independent combat missions of a varying scale. The law also anticipated operational use of the Marine Corps, in case of need, for "rapid reaction" as part of a general system of naval and military presence of the U.S. in areas of the World Ocean.

In the light of such tasks, enormous sums of money are being expended on the formation, maintenance and equipment of adequate Marine Corps units. The total number of marines rose from 170,000 in 1960 to 315,000 during the war in Vietnam, and is now about 200,000. Some 57 percent of the Marine Corps consists of combat-ready personnel; 24 percent is made up of support personnel stationed at bases, training centers or the home front, and 19 percent of the entire personnel is "in transit," i.e. is either in the stage of training or of transfer to a new post of duty. (p 15)

Given the changes in the distribution of forces in the world, the authors question the military-strategic rationale to justify the major financial expenditures for the Marine Corps, the growth rate of which was determined thirty years ago.

In the opinion of the authors, under present conditions, the American Marine Corps is incapable of carrying out any kind of independent role because of the following circumstances:

The geographic position of America's probable adversaries is not favorable for the use, in combat, of the means and forces available to the Marine Corps. These countries are all situated on continents and have a great depth of defense at their disposal;

Forces to ensure the American "military presence" in a number of countries in the world and regions of the World Ocean cannot provide all the conditions needed for a successful landing operation;

The existence of weapons of great destructive force and high-precision striking ability becomes a serious factor which increases the danger to troops

and battle technology wherein attacking forces are organized into battle units, off the enemy's coastline, and are then designed to land and engage in combat on shore;

Because the U.S. Marine Corps is charged with the task of establishing and maintaining uninterrupted sea communications in the World Ocean, as well as in the interest of "strategic containment," the American naval forces, given their present number of ships, cannot ensure the needed and continuous fire support for landing operations in progress. This task is also rendered more difficult by the significant development of offensive weapons becoming available to the armed forces of America's likely enemies. (pp 31-35)

In the light of these facts, the authors regard as unrealistic and unproductive the measures being taken to step up the power of the Marine Corps' tactical aviation for the purpose of "direct aerial support" of landing operations. Modern planes meeting the needs of such a task are primarily designed for operating off aircraft carriers, which would be able to come close enough to the shore of a powerful probable adversary -- something that would involve great risk for the aircraft carriers. (p 49)

For these reasons, the authors believe that the Marine Corps is losing its traditional significance as the most mobile and independently acting part of the advanced units of any American landing force. (p 66) On this basis, they believe it advisable to: a) reduce the size of the Marine Corps and cut down on expenses for providing it with the latest types of jets, and, b) to anticipate the possibility of shifting a certain part of the Marine Corps so as to place it under the U.S. Army command, in certain parts of the world.

In conclusion it should be noted that, judging by the statements of the Marine Corps Commandant, General Louis H. Wilson, during the debate over the military budget for 1977/78, no significant measures are so far being contemplated to reduce the organization, weaponry or future assignments for the Marine Corps. As before, active utilization of the Marine Corps is expected in the performance of one of the principal tasks of U.S. naval forces: the "transfer of military power" beyond the borders of the U.S. in the interest of "securing its global national purposes."

There is no talk here of any significant cut in the size of the Marine Corps. New measures are proposed to increase the battle effectiveness of its aviation and armored-tank equipment.

All this proves that, despite America's own admission of the need to relax international tensions and limit the arms race, the military leadership of the U.S. continues to carry out extensive steps for the further improvement of almost all the components of its armed forces.

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CSO: 1803

CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. DEFENSE POLICY*

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 106-110

/Continuation of serialized translation of excerpts of the book "Current Issues in U.S. Defense Policy," published by the Center for Defense Information, edited by David T. Johnson and Barry R. Schneider, New York, Praeger, 1976/

/Not translated by JPRS/

CSO: 1803

FIFTIETH VOYAGE OF THE 'GLOMAR CHALLENGER'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 111-118

[Article by E. M. Galimov]

[Test] During the 50th voyage of the famous American drilling ship, the Glomar Challenger,¹ in which the author was able to participate, the deepest offshore well in the ocean of the entire project was to be drilled.

On 10 September of last year, the ship sailed out of the Funchal Harbor on the Island of Madeira (Portugal) and made its way to a designated point in the Atlantic Ocean. Clouds of foam stretched from the stern of the ship, caused by shots from hydroacoustic guns. Continuous seismic sounding provided a "view" of not only the topography of the sea bed, but also the structure of the sedimentary mantle of the ocean floor at a depth of several kilometers. This was essential to the correct choice of an area for drilling. Within 40 hours, the ship reached its destination, located in the Moroccan Trench of the Atlantic Ocean, approximately 150 kilometers from the western coastline of Africa.

The Glomar Challenger has unique navigational equipment which makes it possible to pinpoint the exact geographic location of the vessel. Navigational accuracy within a range of a few kilometers is usually regarded as adequate, since this almost always means that the ship is within direct view of the objective. This is not true in the case of drilling. Sometimes it is important to correctly situate a well within a relatively small geological structure. The Glomar Challenger is capable of doing this, since its system of satellite navigation--the ship receives direct signals from six satellites--allows it to pinpoint its location with a degree of precision commensurate to the size of the ship's hull.

When the ship reached its destination, an acoustic buoy was dropped to the ocean floor, and this laid the basis for the latest, 415th oceanic well.

1. A detailed description of the Glomar Challenger can be found in V.A. Krasheninnikov's article, "Deep-Sea Drilling" (SSKA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6, 1971, pp 107-114)--Ed.


The acoustic buoy is the unique "electronic anchor" of the drilling ship. Naturally, during the process of drilling the ship must remain stationary, unaffected by waves, winds and currents. A dislodgment of 20-30 meters at a depth of 3 kilometers can result in dangerous bending of the drilling pipe. The degree and direction of dislodgment are detected by an electronic computer by means of signals received from the acoustic buoy. After processing these signals, the computer switches on one of the engines located on the stern and sides of the ship to compensate for this shift. This system of dynamic positioning is the major distinctive feature of the Glomar Challenger--a feature which allows it to conduct drilling operations while it is afloat and makes it a unique engineering structure.

For a long time, geologists regarded the ocean and the oceanic part of the earth's crust as a relatively calm area of the earth's development, a fairly uneventful area and, therefore, a fairly uninteresting area in the geological sense. But the situation changed dramatically around 15 years ago. The discovery of mid-oceanic ranges and the formulation of the theory of ocean floor dislocation and continental drift made it obvious that the geological history of continents was closely connected with the history of the ocean and, therefore, that the study of fundamental areas of geological science, including studies leading to the large-scale forecasting of mineral reserves, would be impossible without a thorough knowledge of the geological structure and developmental history of the ocean. It was only then that the enormous gap in our knowledge in regard to the continental and oceanic parts of the earth's crust was completely recognized. Hundreds of thousands of wells, many of which were more than 5-6 kilometers deep, had been drilled on continents, but not one had been drilled in the ocean. The composition of oceanic rock could only be judged from isolated samples that had been raised from the ocean floor by dredges or pumps with a depth of a few meters.

In 1964, four of the largest oceanographic institutes in the United States--the Lamont Geological Observatory, the Institute of Marine Science of the University of Miami, the Oceanographic Institution in Woods Hole and the Scripps Institution of Oceanography of the University of California--formed the "Joint Oceanographic Institutions for Deep-Earth Sampling (JOIDES). This organization worked out the plans for the Deep-Sea Drilling Project (DSDP). Its goal consisted in the collection of scientific information for the determination of the age and developmental processes of oceanic basins; its basic strategy consisted in the drilling of deep wells in the ocean. In August 1968, the first drilling operation of the project began. During the 50th voyage, the 415th and 416th wells were drilled.

The drilling was mainly carried out for the acquisition of soil samples (core samples) from the ocean floor. This is done by means of a steel pipe 10 meters long with a plastic lining which fills as the soil is drilled. After each 10 meters, the pipe is lifted by means of a cable and the lining with the core samples is removed and cut into lengths of 1.5 meters each. These plastic cylinders are then capped and are sent for processing to a laboratory, where each cylinder is cut in half lengthwise. One half is

stored in the archives of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, while part of the other half is analyzed on the ship itself and the rest is sent to scientific establishments in various nations.



Общий вид бурового судна «Гломар Челленджер»

Overall view of Glomar Challenger


In principle, the technology of deep-sea drilling is similar to that which is used in the drilling of wells on dry land. Naturally, the rich experience that has been accumulated in oil-drilling operations is used in its entirety here. The ocean, however, introduces certain important peculiarities into the drilling process itself.

Just as on dry land, one of the essential elements of the drilling system is the derrick. The height of the derrick on the Glomar Challenger is 53 meters. It gives the ship a quite extraordinary appearance. The total length of the drilling pipe core, which can be lowered and put into motion by the power systems of the ship, is 7,000 meters.

The drilling of rock requires a bit with hard metal cutting edges. One such bit can usually sink through 300-600 meters, and sometimes 1,000 meters, of the well shaft (depending on the strength of the rock). The bit eventually wears away and must be replaced, which makes it necessary to retract it from the shaft and unscrew all of the parts of the drilling core. After the bit has been replaced, the pipe is again screwed together and the bit is lowered to the bottom hole for further drilling. On dry land, this is a fairly routine operation, but the situation is quite different in the ocean. Here the continuation of drilling requires the location of the entry aperture of the well on the ocean floor at a depth that may sometimes be of several kilometers, and the penetration of this aperture. It is easy to imagine the technical complexity of this operation. This is why the Glomar Challenger, until quite recently, only drilled to depths which could be reached with the use of a single bit.

The results obtained over the course of just a few years have provided invaluable information on the structure and composition of rock formations on the ocean floor. But the fondest hope of geologists is still to penetrate the ocean depth at several thousand meters. This would make it possible to learn the age of oceanic sedimentary deposits and, consequently, to learn the age of the ocean floor and determine the geological history of oceanic development. Another opportunity that would be afforded by drilling at depths below 1,000 meters is of exceptional interest to specialists in the fields of organic geochemistry and the geochemistry of petroleum. This would be the opportunity of verifying whether the oil-formation process can occur in deep-sea formations. In the sedimentary mantles of the continents, this process becomes evident at depths of 1,200-1,500 meters. The objective would now seem to be attainable, since the basic technical problem--the resumption of drilling after replacement of the bit--has already been solved. The Glomar Challenger is equipped with a system that guarantees re-entry into the shaft.

The re-entry operation is performed in the following manner. When the drilling begins, the head of the well is covered with a positioning cone (funnel) with a diameter of 4 meters and with reflectors on its rim. The core of the drilling pipe is unscrewed to almost the full depth of the ocean and is lowered to a position a few meters above the rim of the positioning cone. An audio oscillator is then lowered into the core by means of a cable. We must remember that the multikilometer pipe suspended in the water is set swinging by the movement of the water and the movement of the ship itself; its lower end oscillates several dozen meters. The signals of the audio oscillator, reverberating off the reflectors on the cone, produce patterns on a screen which indicate the relative positions of the cone and the end of the drilling pipe. With the aid of the ship's stabilizers, the vessel is moved to a position in which the end of the drilling pipe oscillates over the cone. At a certain point, when the end of the core is directly over the cone, the command is given to lower the pipe. The drilling instrument is sharply lowered several meters, it enters the cone and slips into the head of the shaft.



Positioning Cone of re-entry system prior to its lowering to the ocean floor

This operation requires a great deal of skill and always involves risk. The end of the drilling instrument can land on the rim of the cone and block it, thereby causing the loss of the well. The shock can break the drilling instrument. Finally, it is possible to simply miss the mark. Incidentally, this occurred during the drilling of the 415th shaft. The core did not fall into the cone, but into the soil next to it. The error was only noticed after the instrument had sunk 64 meters into the soil. It was necessary to extricate the instrument and begin the operation anew. Nonetheless, this "illegitimate" well was registered as No 415B and was therefore listed in the catalog of the deep-sea drilling project. As a rule, however, the operation is completely successful. Twelve such operations were carried out during the drilling of the two wells of the Glomar Challenger's 50th voyage.

There is another feature of deep-sea drilling that complicates the sinking of shafts: the fact that drilling fluid is not recycled. The circulation of this fluid is necessary for the removal of particles of drilled rock from the bottom hole. The fluid is pumped into the core of the drilling pipe, after which it is pumped through the aperture into the bit; it then rises in the space around the pipe. This space between the walls of the shaft and the core of the pipe is formed as a result of the fact that the diameter of the bit is always somewhat greater than the diameter of the pipe. Drilling fluid is usually made of special valuable types of clay with various additives. This kind of drilling mud has a number of important properties and performs other functions in addition to its main one, for example, it reinforces the walls of the shaft and prevents their collapse. When drilling is done on dry land, the drilling mud which rises to the surface from the


well is purified of particles of drilled rock in special settling tanks and is then again pumped into the well. In deep-sea drilling, however, the drilling fluid spills onto the ocean floor, that is, it is not recycled; under these circumstances, it is not wise to use valuable drilling mud. This is why ordinary sea water is used here as drilling fluid, which makes drilling conditions worse and leads to rock slides, the stalling of instruments and other technical complications which tend to become more serious at lower depths, particularly when comparatively porous sedimentary deposits are being drilled.

Both of the drilling operations of the 50th voyage had to be prematurely halted due to rock slides in the wells which could have caused the breakdown (stalling) of the drilling instrument. It is obvious that, after the re-entry problem has been solved, the technology used in the sinking of shafts will become the number-one problem impeding the attainment of greater depths in oceanic sedimentary deposits.

Another important problem, also related to the absence of a recycling system and the location of the open head of the well on the ocean floor, is the problem of preventing the sudden discharge of hydrocarbons. If large accumulations of oil or gas are uncovered during drilling operations, the depth pressure will cause the oil to gush out onto the ocean floor. Oil and gas can be discharged through the core of the drilling pipe directly onto the deck of the ship. This is not only extremely dangerous to the ship and its crew in view of the almost inevitable fire, but can also pollute vast areas of the ocean. In terms of dimensions, the aftereffects of this can greatly exceed the harm caused from time to time by accidents involving oil tankers.

For this reason, extraordinary precautions are taken during all drilling operations. Special instructions indicate the procedures for the selection of drilling areas in the ocean and for the sinking of shafts. Regardless of all other factors, the area chosen for drilling must meet minimum safety requirements in regard to the possibility of uncovering accumulations of hydrocarbons. Core samples are constantly analyzed on board the ship for organic substances and gas, traces of which are usually always present in rock. Any increase in concentration or sudden change in the composition of hydrocarbons are carefully investigated as possible warnings of a nearby hydrocarbon deposit. In those cases when the quantity of hydrocarbons or their qualitative composition exceed critical limits, the drilling must be stopped immediately.

The author, as the ship's specialist in the field of organic geochemistry, was directly responsible for all of the work connected with the safety program and the prevention of pollution. Our group also included K. Taguchi, a geochemist from Japan, A. Botaffo, a Belgian specialist, and D. Fritz, American geological engineer. Relations of genuine scientific cooperation developed between us.



Научная группа 50-го рейса «Гломар Челленджера»

Research group of 50th voyage of Glomar Challenger

As I already mentioned at the beginning of this report, an extremely deep well (more than 3,000 meters below the ocean floor) was to be drilled during the course of the 50th voyage. The danger of hydrocarbon emission increases dramatically at such great depths. This is why the voyage involved careful preparations for work on organic geochemistry and the analysis of hydrocarbons--both from the standpoint of the number of individuals engaged in the work and from the standpoint of the acquisition of all necessary equipment.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to drill to the planned depth. At a depth of 1,094 meters, the drilling of well No 415 had to be halted because the porous rock was constantly collapsing. A decision was made to begin the drilling of a new well in the hope of reaching deeper levels before the end of the voyage. Technical complications caused the cessation of this drilling operation (416) as well, at a depth of 1,624 meters. Nonetheless, both of them are among the deepest wells of the project.

From the standpoint of the danger of hydrocarbons, the situation did not become critical during the 50th voyage, even though a large quantity of gas, which literally burst through the plastic lining during drilling operation 415, and the relatively high content of heavy hydrocarbons at depths of more than 1,300-1,400 meters during the drilling of the next well gave us many minutes of anxiety.

The geochemical research of the 50th voyage ultimately produced something more than mere compliance with the drilling safety program and the prevention of pollution. Several facts of great scientific significance were established. The main ones concerned the characteristic changes in the structure of organic substances and gas in sedimentary deposits below the ocean floor. Beginning at a depth of 1,200-1,400 meters, organic substances have a higher content of hydrocarbon particles, and the composition of gas is characterized by increasing contents of relatively heavy components: propane, butane and pentane. This kind of structural evolution was established long ago for the sedimentary profile of continents. It results in the formation of oil and gas. Now this has been seen for the first time in the sedimentary profile of the ocean. Consequently, the oil-formation process can occur in oceanic basins, just as on continents. This is an extremely important and reassuring discovery, particularly since reserves of oil in the continental part are limited and the situation in regard to oil resources throughout the world may become critical by the end of the century.

The future thorough laboratory analysis of the samples will permit us to expand and clarify these conclusions. A large group of deep-sea sedimentary samples from both drilling operations of the 50th voyage has been sent to the USSR, to our Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry imeni V. I. Vernadskiy of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Here, researchers will conduct precision analyses of the isotope composition of the gas, organic substances and rock and will study the chemical composition and structure of complex organic compounds with the use of mass-spectrometry, nuclear magnetic resonance and other modern methods.

In general, the most complex and precise analytical work with the soil samples derived from the drilling process is probably performed ashore, in laboratories that are specially equipped for this kind of research. On the ship itself, scientific analysis is carried out on a limited scale and is mainly performed for the purpose of geological control over the course of the drilling. In other words, only that work which is absolutely necessary is done. This is usually connected with the need for routine geological guidance or the analysis of certain properties of the rock which might change or be lost during the prolonged storage of samples.

I must say that, although the technical equipment on the ship is quite impressive, it did not have all of the equipment and devices that we might consider to be essential equipment on our own ships. The reason for this, strange as it may seem, frequently consists in limited financial possibilities. But I must stress the fact that each operation which is carried out

is completely equipped, down to the last detail. It is almost impossible for a valuable piece of equipment to be used inefficiently due to the lack of some kind of secondary or auxiliary part. If the operation cannot be completely guaranteed from start to finish, it is not carried out at all.

The group of scientific personnel on the Glomar Challenger is a small one. During our voyage, this group consisted of 14 individuals. The 50th voyage was an international undertaking. Scientists from many nations took part in it. The research group was headed by two supervisors--Dr J. Winterer from the United States and Dr I. Lanslo from France. Both are prominent experts on marine geology and have taken part in several Glomar Challenger expeditions. They coordinated the work of the research group, determined the overall scientific strategy of the expedition and performed a great deal of organizational work of various types.

The core sample was first examined by sedimentologists--specialists in the geological analysis of sedimentary rock--who determined its type, color, composition, stratification and conditions of formation. This work was done in concert or individually by Dr Marta Melguin, prominent specialist in oceanic sedimentology from France, Dr I. Price from England, who was, incidentally, my cabin-mate and to whom I am obligated for the augmentation of my knowledge of petrology,² Dr A. Bossolini from Italy, who was a professional soccer player in his youth and is now a professor of geology, and Dr V. Schlager from the United States, brilliant sedimentologist and also an athlete.

The determination of the age of drilled deposits is just as important for the correct study of the geological profile. Paleontologists can determine the age of rock from the type of fossils of ancient organisms it contains. This is extremely painstaking work, which requires many hours of continuous observation under a microscope. Each paleontologist usually works primarily on one group of marine microorganisms. Dr E. Vincent from France and Dr B. Slider studied the Foraminifera, Dr P. Chepek from the FRG studied the Coccolithidae and D. Westberg from the United States studied the Radiolaria. All of them are specialists of the highest qualifications and prominent scientists in their own fields. I have already discussed the group of geochemists.

During the voyage, the work is performed according to an extremely full schedule. During the intervals which sometimes occur in the drilling process, small scientific conferences are organized to discuss daily results, exchange opinions and compile a report. Each researcher is responsible for the compilation of the report in his own field and the submission of all documents in the appropriate format: He constructs graphs and diagrams and presents a preliminary interpretation and assessment of the results.

2. Petrology is the science of the genesis and historical origins of the rock formations making up the earth's crust.

When the ship enters the harbor and the scientific personnel go ashore, a report consisting of one or several volumes, already printed and completely edited, remains on board. A year later, supplemented by the research material of land laboratories on the soil samples, this report is published in the form of the latest official "Blue Book" of the Deep-Sea Drilling Project.

While I have been describing the work of the Glomar Challenger, cosmic analogies have suggested themselves quite frequently. In part, this may be due to the fact that the ship works in close contact with satellites. It is equipped with direct satellite navigation and receives information on the weather directly from satellites. There are many similarities in the external characteristics of the work: For example, the dynamic positioning of the ship with the aid of instantaneous correction engines. The operations involved in the location of the head of the shaft are amazingly reminiscent of space rendezvous. But the analogy evidently goes even deeper. Just as space research, marine research forces one to think in global categories, to think about the world as a whole; just as space research, research on the ocean floor is conducted with an eye to the future; and just as space research, research on the world ocean primarily demonstrates the spirit of international cooperation.

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SEA GRANT PROGRAM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 118-124

[Article by I. B. Ikonnikov and G. P. Lisov]

[Text] On an August day in 1972, there was a feeling of extraordinary excitement on the shore of Grand Traverse Bay in Lake Michigan. A strange device, reminiscent of a lunar space module (Figure 1) [photos not reproduced], was resting on three supports at the water's edge. A group of young people energetically pushed the device into the water. Several minutes went by and then the cold waters of the bay covered the first underwater research laboratory in the Great Lakes, the "lake lab."¹

This event attracted the attention of the local public mainly because the new underwater laboratory, despite the technical complexity of such devices, was developed by an academic institution--the University of Michigan. The faculty at the University not only received access to a new means for teaching skindiving, but also an effective instrument for research on the flora and fauna of the Great Lakes.

This is not an isolated case of direct participation by American higher academic institutions in the creation of technical means for marine research and development. Since 1968, the "Edalhab" (Figure 2) [photos not reproduced] underwater laboratory has been submerged in American waters; it was developed by the teachers and students of the University of New Hampshire.² Students have spent dozens of hours in this laboratory, usually at a depth of around 10 meters. In addition to conducting research on medicobiological subjects, the individuals taking part in the experiment tested the reliability of instruments for the collection of soil samples and the operational features of various instruments and control and measurement equipment.

Academic institutions usually coordinate their plans for scientific work with the interests of their own city or state. In this sense, the University of Hawaii presents a characteristic example. It took part in solving the problem of the overpopulation of the Hawaiian Archipelago. Students,

graduate students and instructors at the University designed and constructed a model of a floating city with an estimated cost of 100-200 million dollars (Figure 3) [photos not reproduced]. The originality of the project consists in its so-called modular principle of construction.³ The floating city is to consist of individual blocks (modules), each of which represents a sector supported by three vertical cylindrical pontoons. The sectors are to contain the residential districts of the city, while the vertical pontoons will contain the business districts (electric power stations, warehouses, storage facilities for liquid fuel and installations for the processing or disposal of household waste). A circular monorail is the suggested form of municipal transport.

Although the floating city project has not been considered for practical realization, the very fact that an attempt was made to work out this kind of unique structure in detail, including the aerohydrodynamic testing of the model, attracted the attention of the state government. Proposals were made to use this design for the construction of a floating exhibition center with pavillions, hotels, office buildings and so forth in 1978, for the 200th anniversary of the discovery of the Hawaiian Islands by James Cook.

One of the most complex technical designs executed within the walls of a higher academic institution was the remote-control underwater unit with a minicomputer on board which was developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.⁴ This unit, with a streamlined cylindrical form, has a length of 2.4 meters, a diameter of 0.4 meters and a weight of 113 kilograms. Most of the cylindrical body is aluminum, while the ends are fiberglass. The unit can carry various equipment with a total weight of 22 kilograms and, in addition to this, an automatic movie camera and "underwater eye"--an ultrasonic direction finder.

The activities of the American higher academic institutions in the study and development of the world ocean, which are aiding in the resolution of the problems involved in training qualified personnel for this work, are being promoted by a unique governmental stimulatory policy which deserves more thorough discussion.

For decades, a national program of research and development in the world ocean has been carried out in the United States by the American colleges and universities. This program, which was established by law on 15 October 1966 as a program to promote the participation of higher academic institutions in research on the ocean and the development of its resources,⁵ is intended to supplement existing governmental plans in this area and solve the problem of training specialists in oceanography.

In accordance with this law, the Sea Grant Program is aimed at the development of marine biological and mineral resources, the training of specialists for the utilization of these resources, the development of the necessary technical means and the stimulation of marine farming.⁶ The major distinctive feature of this program consists in its emphasis on the

application of the practical results of research--research which is to be coordinated with areas of knowledge which had never before been concentrated in a single program. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which depicts the traditional two-dimensional plan for relating fundamental research to the areas of the practical application of research results. The Sea Grant Program adds a third dimension to this "flat" diagram, that is, it relates the results of fundamental studies and the areas of their application to the sphere of the humanities, law, economics, politics, administrative affairs, etc. (Figure 5).

	Defense	Fishing	Oil drilling	Maritime recreation	Others
Chemistry					
Biology					
Physics					
Geology					
Medicine, etc.					

Figure 4. Traditional two-dimensional plan for relating fundamental studies to areas for the practical application of their results

In this way, the Sea Grant Program encompasses and interrelates more areas of knowledge than previous programs in oceanography, initiates cooperation by specialists in the most diverse fields and ensures the resolution of problems in their entirety, in all of their basic facets and aspects.

The main points of the program are implemented through a fairly flexible mechanism of multistage financing which gives the academic institutions freedom to compete and opportunities to display initiative. The program envisages the future rise of a contending institution from one level of financing to another and, in this way, secures it in this area of activity.




Figure 5. Three-dimensional plan of "Sea Grant Program"

Key:

- | | |
|--------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Chemistry | 7. Oil drilling |
| 2. Biology | 8. Maritime recreation |
| 3. Physics | 9. Maritime law |
| 4. Geology | 10. Economics |
| 5. Defense | 11. Politics |
| 6. Fishing | 12. Administrative affairs |

The institutions receiving the right to the higher form of financing are called sea grant colleges. In accordance with law, this kind of college must have all of the resources for exhaustive marine research and development. The status of a sea grant college primarily presupposes expansion of the financing base, particularly in the case of fundamental long-range programs. The institutions achieving this status take on the functions of regional centers for the mobilization and direction of all of the work done to develop marine resources in the given region.

The prospects of achieving sea grant college status serves the higher academic institutions as an effective stimulus. In addition to material advantages, this status gives the university or institution official confirmation of its high qualifications for any kind of oceanographic research. But it is not a simple thing to achieve this status. The first sea grant colleges (the University of Washington, the University of Rhode Island, Oregon State University and Texas A & M) only appeared 5 years after the commencement of the program. A year later, they were joined by two other universities--the University of Hawaii and the University of Wisconsin. In 1975, this status was acquired by the University of California, New York State University and Cornell, and in 1976 by the universities of Delaware and Florida.⁷

Higher Educational Institutions	Research Projects	Allocations, in Thousands of Dollars
University of Delaware	Measures to prevent destruction of coastline (administrative problems)	345.0
University of Rhode Island	Methods of protecting sea from pollution	1,130.0
Oregon State University	Effect of oil spills on marine flora and fauna in the Beaufort Sea and in the Bay of Alaska	330.0
University of North Carolina	Conservation of marine biological resources, protection of coastline and organization of eel farming	535.0
Universities of Maine and New Hampshire	Artificial propagation of mussels, salmon and oysters; development of floating breakwaters	860.0
Associated State Colleges of Mississippi and Alabama	The use of old ship hulls as artificial reefs for the attraction of marine organisms; the study of fish diseases; the compilation of an Atlas of Mobile Bay	859.0
Oklahoma State University	Possibilities of using extract of certain marine organisms in the treatment of cancer and cardiovascular diseases	90.0
University of Wisconsin (Madison)	The effect of shelf development on the ecology of the Pribilof Islands in the Bering Sea	32.0
The Florida state universities	Coastal jurisdiction; study of the process of the corrosion of ferroconcrete structures in sea water	975.0
Massachusetts Institute of Technology	Development of oceanic resources	890.0
University of Washington	Advanced training of specialists in oceanography; development of scientific and technical information services	1,352.0
University of Michigan	Protection of Great Lakes coastline from erosion	450.0

At first, the Sea Grant Program had two levels of financing--institutional (for the financing of a group of studies) and project (for the financing of a specific project or study). The institutional category could be aspire to by the universities and institutes that were best prepared for the resolution of the major problems in the program. After an experimental period of 3-4 years, the best of these could apply for the status of a sea grant

colleges. Therefore, the institutional grant category had the purpose of assisting universities to become sea grant colleges and of reinforcing their scientific potential. The criteria qualifying institutes for grants of this category are extremely strict. The contending institution must have solid experience in sea research and in the training of oceanographic personnel, the necessary equipment and financial means for so-called compensatory funds (no less than one-third of the cost of contracts) and a well-coordinated program of courses in oceanography. Finally, it must be in a region with developed marine industries.

The project financing category is for the financing of research on new areas of science and technology, particularly during those stages when a new item is only beginning to be introduced and its economic advantages cannot be assessed. This category of financing permits research groups not having the potential for the comprehensive study of scientific problems to become involved in oceanographic research. But they must also satisfy fairly strict requirements (experience in the chosen field, the appropriate material and technical facilities, compensatory financial resources, etc.).

The first years of the existence of the Sea Grant Program revealed a large gap in the qualitative level of contenders for the first and second types of financing. For this reason, it was necessary to introduce a third, intermediary level. This category was used to finance groups of specific projects with a common goal or a common object of research. The intermediary category stimulates the higher academic institutions to conduct research that will qualify them for the institutional category of financing. It also involves educational institutions with a good scientific reputation but a specific area of competence in the Sea Grant Program.

Most of the budget for the Sea Grant Program is used for the institutional category of financing. For example, of the 65 scientific projects subsidized in accordance with the plan for the 1974 fiscal year, 15 were financed through the institutional category (75 percent of the total budget), 10 through the intermediary category, and 40 through the project financing category.⁸ In 10 years, the Sea Grant Program has involved the allocation of a total of 163.4 million dollars of federal funds. These allocations gradually increased with each fiscal year--from 1 million dollars in 1967 to 23.2 million in 1977.

During the years of the program's realization, it has involved more than 120 academic institutions, 400 federal agencies, private companies and firms, 3,600 scientists and engineers and approximately 1,700 students.⁹ The subject matter of the studies conducted within the framework of this program can be judged from the examples presented in the table.

The fame of the Sea Grant Program has spread beyond U.S. borders. Many nations are attempting to apply this experience to their own circumstances. The U.S. Government is now considering plans for a continued increase in the funds allocated for this program which would ultimately raise the annual budget to 50 million dollars and the number of sea grant colleges to 23.¹⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. SEA GRANT 70'S, September 1972, p 4.
2. UNDERSEA TECHNOLOGY, February 1970, p 30.
3. SEA GRANT 70'S, October 1971, p 5.
4. SEA TECHNOLOGY, December 1975, p 34.
5. "Public Law 89-688. National Sea Grant College and Program Act," 89th Congress, 15 October 1966.
6. Ibid., Sec 204(i).
7. OCEAN SCIENCE NEWS, 14 May 1976, p 5.
8. SEA GRANT 70'S, July 1973, p 5.
9. OCEAN SCIENCE NEWS, 24 October 1975, p 4.
10. Ibid., 7 May 1976, p 4.

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NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 77
pp 125-127

[Summary] This is a vast administrative region in the north of Canada, bounded by the Hudson Strait on the east and Alaska on the west. The seat of government is in Ottawa. The region has an area of 3.38 million square kilometers (33.9 percent of all Canadian territory) and a population of around 39,000 (less than 0.2 percent of the total Canadian population). The capital is Yellowknife, with a population of around 6,000. The region formerly included the Prairie Provinces and the northern parts of Quebec and Ontario. It passed to the Dominion of Canada in 1869.

The region is mainly low-lying, consisting of valleys and plateaus. Only the western regions are mountainous. There are innumerable lakes, the largest of which are the Great Bear Lake and the Great Slave Lake. The chief industry is goldmining. Oil and natural gas were discovered in the Mackenzie River delta in the 1970's.

The arctic and subarctic climate of the territories is severe, providing almost no opportunities for farming and complicating every other kind of economic activity. Winters are very cold and summers are short. Much of the area is covered by permafrost. Less than 5 percent of the territory is occupied by productive forests.

For several thousand years, this region has been inhabited by Eskimo tribes. Europeans--mostly fur traders, trappers, whalers and prospectors--began to penetrate this region in the 17th century. From 1670 through 1870 these were mostly representatives of the English Hudson Bay Company. The Europeans destroyed the basis of the traditional economy of the natives, sharply reducing the herd of caribou and seals. The resulting starvation and the diseases brought by the Europeans to this region caused the native population to dwindle from 24,200 in 1725 to 7,100 in 1921. The population is now growing quite rapidly; the average annual growth rate of the population of the Northwest Territories is 4 percent, while the rate for the total Canadian population is only 2.2 percent.

In February 1976, the Eskimos demanded that the Canadian Government recognized their exclusive right to the territory of the Canadian Arctic. Their request was denied, but the fact that it was made by the representatives of 15,000 Eskimos graphically illustrates the increasing political activity of the native population of the Northwest Territories.

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